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Abstract 
The main argument of this thesis is that the penitentiary crisis in Venezuela is 
brought about an inept criminal justice system whose functioning (or lack thereof) further 
exacerbates overcrowding in penitentiary facilities as well as violates the most basic 
human rights. More elaborately, I argue that the unintentional (mis)use of pre-trial 
preventive detention, one of the consequences of the inept criminal justice system, further 
exacerbates the overcrowding in prisons and creates serious human rights implications. 
The purpose of this study is to establish a connection between the penitentiary crisis in 
Venezuela, with a focus on pre-trial preventive detention, and the larger criminal justice 
system failure in the country.  The data source and data gathering technique for the thesis 
consists of a content analysis and a secondary literature review. Since the theoretical 
framework of the project is international human rights, instruments from the United 
Nations and the Organization of American States are used. Reports from non-
governmental organizations like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and 
Observatorio Venezolano de Prisiones provide the data to conduct the analysis which is 
specific to pre-trial preventive detention in Venezuela. These reports are produced on a 
yearly basis and will help to compliment the data obtained from government sources, 
mainly the Venezuelan Ombudsman’s office. The findings of the thesis support the 
argument that contrary to common belief, the (mis)use of pre-trial preventive detention in 
Venezuela is in fact mainly accidental, it is not systematic in the sense that it is not 
targeting a particular group of people due to their political affiliation and/or beliefs. 
Furthermore, I prove that Venezuelan penitentiary facilities are overcrowded due to the 
(mis)use of pre-trial preventive detention. Immediate recommendations for the 
v 
Venezuelan state include re-categorizing the penal population in Venezuela as well as 
diminishing the use of deprivation of liberty, specifically pre-trial preventive detention. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The initial objective of this thesis was to study the problems experienced in 
Venezuelan prisons and their underlying causes during the administration of President 
Hugo Chávez. However, as the research process progressed, I realized that the highly 
reported penitentiary crisis in Venezuela emerged from a larger criminal justice system 
failure, and not solely because of the many problems found within the penitentiary 
facilities themselves. The penitentiary system in Venezuela is over its capacity, and the 
criminal justice system is in shambles. Consequently, unconvicted persons can be found 
in prisons and convicted criminals in police stations; convicted and unconvicted mixed 
together. 
Although the present penitentiary crisis in Venezuela has received considerable 
media attention, I noticed that existing research on the much more specific topic of pre-
trial preventive detention in Venezuela was minimal, mainly pursued on behalf of inter-
governmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs); often 
leading to highly politicized narratives on the topic. Furthermore, when mainstream 
media outlets did discuss pre-trial preventive detention in Venezuela, the conversation 
tended to focus on particular cases of political importance, as in the case of Judge Maria 
Lourdes Afiuni Mora, which further shifted the discussion into the realm of the political. 
Consequently, this thesis intends to provide a counter-hegemonic perspective on the 
2 
issue. I aim to prove that the penitentiary crisis is brought about deficiencies in the 
Venezuelan criminal justice system which further exacerbate overcrowding in 
penitentiary facilities as well as violate the most basic human rights. Pre-trial preventive 
detention is an important component/consequence of this. 
Pre-trial preventive detention refers to the detention of an unconvicted individual. 
Although this practice has gained notoriety internationally as a consequence of the United 
States’ Global War on Terror (specifically, due to its aberrant usage in the Guantanamo 
Bay Detention Camp where no trial is implied in the future), pre-trial preventive 
detention is in actuality an internationally accepted practice. So much so that there are 
established international guidelines which outline the minimum requirements that states 
must comply with when using pre-trial preventive detention. Meant to protect the human 
rights of detainees, these guidelines mainly focus on the legitimacy and legality of the 
detention as well as on the treatment of the detainee. 
Although there are established guidelines for the practice of pre-trial preventive 
detention, these procedures are often ignored. Venezuela is an intriguing example 
because, unlike in the case of the United States where these international guidelines are 
violated intentionally, the Venezuelan state seems to be disregarding the established 
guidelines almost on accident, predominantly as a result of an inept criminal justice 
system.  
The failing criminal justice system in Venezuela is best made palpable by the 
conditions in the penitentiary facilities. The deadly riots at prisons El Rodeo I and II 
during the months of June and July of 2011 highlighted and verified that the problem in 
3 
Venezuelan prisons is an emergency.1 The 27-day long standoff between the National 
Guard and the inmates as well as the death of 22 individuals is just an example of an all 
too common ongoing story of the Venezuelan penitentiary crisis.2 Protests conducted by 
the inmates themselves as well as their families, both within as well as outside of prison 
walls, demanding the betterment of conditions and treatment continue on a periodic basis; 
and gang-related violence both inside and outside of the prisons has become 
commonplace. For instance, in mid-August of 2012, the battle between two groups of 
inmates in the Centro Penitenciario Región Capital Cárcel Yare, south of Caracas, left 25 
dead and 43 wounded.3 The level of devastation caused by these two instances is not an 
exception, but rather the norm. These are just two examples of the everyday violence 
experienced in the penitentiary facilities in Venezuela. More recently, on January 25-27, 
2013, the Uribana prison riots left 58 inmates dead and 46 others wounded, according to 
official sources and placed Venezuela’s prison conditions again on the international 
stage.4 The massacre occurred due to the revelation of a secret government operative 
                                                 
 
 
 
1
 Virginia López, “Venezuela Prison Uprising Ends after 27 Days of Violence,” The Guardian, 
July 13, 2011, http://m.guardiannews.com/world/2011/jul/14/venezuela-prison-uprising-violence. 
2
 Ibid.  
3
 Valentina Lares Martiz, “Nueva Pelea Entre Presos Deja 25 Muertos En Cárcel Venezolana,” El 
Tiempo, August 20, 2012. http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/mas-de-20-muertos-deja-
enfrentamiento-en-prision-venezolana-_12144001-4. 
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 Petra Dos Santos, “Min. Varela: 58 personas perdieron la vida en hechos de violencia en 
Uribana,” Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Comunicación y la Información, January 27, 2013. 
http://www.minci.gob.ve/2013/01/min-varela-58-personas-perdieron-la-vida-en-hechos-de-violencia-en-
uribana/ 
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meant to disarm one of the most heavily armed prisons in Venezuela, which had become 
increasingly violent in the week prior to the riots as a result of a gang related-dispute over 
control.5 
Prison violence of the physical kind is just one of the many problems facing the 
Venezuelan prison system. More explicitly than perhaps in the other examples, the source 
of the protest mentioned above in prisons El Rodeo I and II have to do with other types of 
violence, structural violence. For instance, it is estimated that the current prison system is 
at three times its capacity, with over 40,000 prisoners in a system built for 12,000.6 In 
addition to the lack of penitentiary establishments, prisoners rarely have access to health 
care due to a lack of investment in health care facilities, medical supplies, and doctors. 
The penitentiary system also lacks sufficient sanitary facilities for prisoners, and 
consistently experiences issues such as sewage leaks and clogged sewers. But, apart from 
the infrastructural problems mentioned, Venezuelan prisoners also experience rare and 
inconsistent access to educational and vocational opportunities, have no food security, 
and rarely any access to potable water. 
Other less violent problems within the Venezuelan penitentiary system include the 
lack of professionalism practiced by the Public Ministry as well as the judges, in part 
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 Catherine Shoichet, “Report: Prison riots kills dozens in Venezuela,” CNN, January 26, 2012. 
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 Amnesty International, Venezuela: Human Rights Guarantees Must Be Respected: a Summary of 
Human Rights Concerns. (2011). 
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because of a deficiency in trained technicians.7 Illegal detentions and procedural delays 
also plague the system. These less obvious inefficiencies are important because they 
further exacerbate the poor conditions in the prisons. However, although important, these 
inefficiencies have been rarely discussed, much less studied, in detail. These issues have 
not been a priority when analyzing the penitentiary crisis in Venezuela. 
This thesis presents the structural problems found in the Venezuelan criminal 
justice system as a leading cause of human rights abuse. Specifically, the thesis focuses 
on pre-trial preventive detention. Furthermore, this research arose from a concern for 
those individuals within the Venezuelan penitentiary system. The discussion revolves 
around a moral problem: if the Venezuelan penitentiary system is failing the convicted 
prison population, then it is failing even more those who are not convicted. 
Venezuelan detainees experience violations to many of the human rights not only 
guaranteed by the Venezuelan constitution, the nation’s penal and criminal procedure 
codes, but also by regional and international human rights instruments, the most general, 
and perhaps fundamental of which include: the right to human dignity; the right to life 
and security; the right to be innocent until proved guilty; the right to treatment 
appropriate to an individual’s unconvicted status, including the right to be kept separate 
from convicted prisoners; and the guarantee that arrests, detentions or imprisonment 
                                                 
 
 
 
7
 Observatorio Venezolano de Prisiones, Situación de los derechos humanos y procesales de las 
personas privadas de libertad en Venezuela. (2007). 119. 
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should only be carried out in accordance to the law as well as by competent officials. A 
real life example in Venezuela of these violations includes the mixing of detainees with 
the rest of the convicted prison population, which places them in great danger. The 
penitentiary system in Venezuela does not classify convicted felons according to the 
severity of their crimes and/or dangerousness. This occurs even though guidelines 
(national, regional, and international) establish that individuals under detention must be 
kept separate from the general prison population. Another example of the routine 
violations experienced by detainees in Venezuela is that they are regularly held for longer 
than the two year maximum established by the Venezuelan Organic Code of Criminal 
Procedure. 
The main argument of this thesis is that the penitentiary crisis in Venezuela is 
brought about an inept criminal justice system whose functioning (or lack thereof) further 
exacerbates overcrowding in penitentiary facilities as well as violates the most basic 
human rights. This thesis puts forth two other hypotheses which further develop the main 
argument just previously mentioned. The first emphasizes the (mis)use of pre-trial 
preventive detention as a main factor contributing to overcrowding in Venezuelan 
prisons. The second hypothesis stresses that the (mis)use of pre-trial preventive detention 
is not done purposefully, but rather occurs on accident as a result of an inept criminal 
justice system. 
More elaborately, I believe that the mismanagement of the entire criminal justice 
system leads to the exacerbation of the problems in the prisons. Overcrowding is of 
particular importance because it continues to erode the existing dilapidating prison 
7 
infrastructure and few available services in the facilities. Even though pre-trial preventive 
detention is allowed for a maximum of two years under the Venezuelan Organic Code of 
Criminal Procedure, the system works in such a way that deprives many Venezuelans of 
their liberty, and they are often kept in conditions of pre-trial preventive detention past 
the allotted legal time. Therefore, I argue that the (mis)use of pre-trial preventive 
detention further exacerbates the overcrowding in prisons and creates serious human 
rights implications. 
The second part of the argument of this thesis claims that there is also a 
widespread political discourse which has allowed the depiction of the (mis)use of pre-
trial preventive detention to be based on political terms. Consequently, I argue that 
contrary to common belief, the (mis)use of pre-trial preventive detention is accidental, 
that it is not systematic in the sense that it is not targeting a particular group of people due 
to their political affiliation and/or beliefs. 
Methodology 
The theoretical framework of this thesis is international human rights. The thesis 
incorporates an outline of principle human rights legal frameworks protecting detained 
persons and a presentation of Venezuela’s positioning within this context. Looking into 
these legal frameworks will help to place Venezuela along a spectrum of rights respecting 
democracies based on a internationalist, universal, and minimalist approach to human 
rights, and for the purpose of this thesis, the rights of detained persons specifically. 
8 
The data source and data gathering technique for the thesis consists of a content 
analysis and a secondary literature review. Since the theoretical framework of the project 
is international human rights, instruments such as the United Nations (UN) Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), and the Organization of American States (OAS) American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man, and the American Convention on Human Rights are 
used. Consequently, these standards, because of their universal nature also apply to those 
individuals deprived of their liberty, regardless of the nature of their crime. The UDHR 
and ICCPR were chosen as documents for analysis because of their centrality to the 
human rights regime. In fact, the UDHR defined human rights for the first time and it 
also spearheaded the promotion of these rights on the global scale since the end of the 
Second World War. In other words, there would be no human rights without the UDHR. 
Moreover, both the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the 
American Convention on Human Rights were chosen mainly to better explain the 
adoption and interpretation of the universal human rights proposed by the UDHR into the 
regional context of the Americas. 
Other international human rights instruments more specific to the cause of 
detainee and prisoner rights include: The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners, the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, the Body of Principles for 
the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (the Torture Convention), and the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement 
Officials. Similar to the UN’s Torture Convention, the OAS has the Inter-American 
9 
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. These instruments are of importance because 
they set the international guidelines. Since the framework of the project is first and 
foremost international human rights, the analysis of these instruments allows me to place 
Venezuela in the international context and establish its position with regard to human 
rights within this global setting. 
Reports from NGOs like Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch 
(HRW), and Observatorio Venezolano de Prisiones (OVP, Venezuelan Prison 
Observatory) provide the data to conduct the analysis which is specific to preventive 
detention. These reports are produced on a yearly basis (for the most part) and will help 
to compliment the data obtained from government sources, mainly the Venezuelan 
Ombudsman’s office. 
The Bolivarian Constitution, the Venezuelan Penal Code, the Venezuelan Organic 
Code of Criminal Procedure, the Regulations for Judicial Internment Centers as well as 
Venezuelan government sources, including the newly established Ministry of Penitentiary 
Services, are used to explain the Chávez administration’s conceptualization of human 
rights into its politics and policies. 
This set of data sources were chosen because they provide a range of international 
and local perspectives, of more political to less political associations (or at least outside 
of the governmental realm), and of high opposition to the vast support for the Chávez 
regime. Therefore, the UN, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) 
(a branch from the OAS), AI, and HRW all provide an international perspective. While 
the UN and the IACHR provide an inter-governmental, perhaps political account, NGOs 
10 
like AI and HRW provide less political (but nevertheless politicized) views on the 
violation of the human rights of detainees in Venezuela. Furthermore, the IACHR also 
provides a regional perspective while the local NGO, OVP, expresses a local but biased 
opposition perspective that counterbalances the government narrative. 
Consequently, the units of observation in this thesis are reports produced by 
NGOs, both international and local, as well as IGOs, and the Venezuelan government 
itself. A concern when dealing with the country reports as well as official statistics is the 
possibility of not being able to access all annual accounts. On the other hand, the unit of 
analysis for this thesis consists solely of individuals under preventive detention in the 
Venezuelan penitentiary system. The individuals in the Venezuelan prison system that 
conform to the definition of detainees under preventive detention. Furthermore, the 
period of analysis is from February 2, 1999, when Chávez took the presidency for the 
first time, until March 5, 2013, the day of Chávez’s death. The research used 
purposive/judgmental sampling to determine its units of observation. Therefore, the data 
sources were chosen because they were viewed to be the most useful for the purposes of 
this thesis.  
Annual human rights country reports from 1999 until 2012 from the previously 
mentioned sources are evaluated.  Each annual country report will be examined, 
searching specifically for cases of pre-trial preventive detention, the offenses associated 
with them, as well as the length of the detentions discussed. 
This is a descriptive and exploratory research study. I seek to provide an in-depth 
evaluation of the Venezuelan case in regards to the (mis)use of pre-trial preventive 
11 
detention. The importance of this thesis is, in part, due to its emphasis on a contradiction: 
A democratic regime which openly and very strongly supports human rights but has 
failed to protect the prison population’s most basic human rights. Furthermore, research 
on this general topic, human rights violations in the Venezuelan penitentiary system, has 
been consistently focused solely on prison conditions instead of on the factors that 
contribute to the prison conditions in the first place. Even the government response has 
been one that focuses on improving the actual penitentiary establishments, a step forward, 
but still a step that disregards the larger issues that will continue to exacerbate the human 
rights failures. Therefore, this research seeks to unveil how a regime with such 
characteristics can fail to meaningfully tackle human rights questions in its prisons, and 
still successfully label itself as supportive of human rights. 
Chapter Overview 
The structure of the thesis consists of six total chapters. Chapter 2 provides the theoretical 
literature and, in turn, the foundation of the entire thesis. This section begins with a basic 
background on human rights using Jack Donnelly’s (2007) interpretation of international 
human rights. Subsequently, an explanation of the meaning of pre-trial preventive 
detention follows. Then, a description of the development of criminology in Latin 
America and in Venezuela is provided in order to place the (mis)use of pre-trial 
preventive detention into context. 
Chapter 3 provides an insight into the contemporary Venezuelan historical-
political context. This chapter explains the immediate conditions preceding the Chávez 
administration which led to his rise to power as well as his administration’s emphasis on 
12 
human rights. This chapter is central to understanding the overwhelming impact the 
actual administration has had on the country in general and, in turn, it also facilitates in 
assessing the administration’s shortfalls, specifically when it comes to the (mis)use of 
pre-trial preventive detention. 
Chapter 4 highlights the penitentiary crisis in Venezuela focusing on the 
perceptions of the penitentiary system on behalf of the general Venezuelan public as well 
as inmates, and also the system’s actual conditions both before and during the Chávez 
administration. This chapter demonstrates that the vast problems in the prisons have 
existed prior to the Chávez administration; that these issues are not particularly new nor 
consequences of the Bolivarian Revolution. Furthermore, the chapter provides an insight 
into a new initiative the government has taken in order to deal with the penitentiary crisis. 
Chapter 5 elaborates the statement of the problem: that the penitentiary crisis in 
Venezuela is brought about an inept criminal justice system whose functioning further 
exacerbates overcrowding in penitentiary facilities as well as violates the most basic 
human rights. The case of Judge Afiuni is introduced and compared to that of other less 
reported cases of pre-trial preventive detention in Venezuela. 
Chapter 6 is the concluding chapter and provides an overview of the entire thesis, 
highlights the findings, proposes immediate policy recommendations, and signals areas 
for further research. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Literature 
This chapter serves as a foundation of the thesis, helping to place the (mis)use of 
pre-trial preventive detention in Venezuela into context. I argue that the penitentiary crisis 
in Venezuela is brought about an inept criminal justice system whose functioning (or lack 
thereof) further exacerbates overcrowding in penitentiary facilities as well as violates the 
most basic human rights. A main component contributing to the penitentiary crisis in 
Venezuela is the (mis)use of pre-trial preventive detention which continues to inject 
individuals into an inept system. Most importantly, the (mis)use of pre-trial preventive 
detention occurs as a consequence of ineptitude, rather than political persecution. 
The section on the theoretical literature on human rights first and foremost, 
highlights the universality of human rights; rights inherent to all human beings because of 
their humanity. This section also explains the state’s responsibilities as the main 
proprietor of human rights within an internationalist system of human rights. 
Nevertheless, the importance of regional and international factors in the protection of 
human rights is also emphasized. This chapter also defines pre-trial preventive detention 
and provides insight into how the (mis)use of pre-trial preventive detention can lead to an 
aberration of traditional criminal justice systems. The chapter concludes with a section on 
the development of criminology in Latin America, although highly punitive since its 
beginnings, there has been recent attempts to try and change this tendency. 
14 
Human Rights Theoretical Framework 
Jack Donnelly, in his book entitled International Human Rights (2007), explains 
that in the English language, “right” has two principal moral and political senses. The 
first places a focus on the righteousness of a required action as well as on the duty-
bearer’s obligation to do “what is right.”8 The second refers to a special entitlement that 
one has to something. In this sense the focus is on the relationship between the right-
holder and duty-bearer.9 Therefore, the “right” in human rights can be understood as a 
combination of both senses, highlighting the moral righteousness of the right-holder’s 
entitlements and the political duties of the duty-bearer to respect, protect, and fulfill those 
entitlements. While convicted felons may have violated their obligation to do “what is 
right,” they are still subjected to the second sense regarding their entitlement as right-
holders. If this is so then the case of detainees is unique since their criminal status is 
ambiguous and we cannot know if they have failed to fulfill their obligations. According 
to Donnelly, Henry Shue argues that all human rights (and most rights in general) entail 
three responsibilities: To be conducive to the right-holders’ enjoyment of their rights; to 
protect against the deprivation of their rights; and to aid those whose rights have been 
violated.10 Donnelly defines human rights as those entitlements that are inherent to 
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 Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights (Boulder: Westview Press, 2007), 21. 
9
 Ibid., 22. 
10
 Ibid., 27. 
15 
human beings simply because of their humanity.11 These rights are held by all human 
beings equally and inalienably.12 They are considered special due to their moral 
supremacy in comparison to all other rights and as a result, they trump any other type of 
law or right. Furthermore, denying these entitlements is considered improper and even 
harmful.13 
There are two major interpretations on the theory of human nature which justify 
why belonging to the human species gives rise to particular rights. One interpretation is 
scientific while the other takes a moral position. Adherents of the scientific approach to 
human nature perceive human rights as those entitlements meant to fulfill the most basic 
human needs. On the other hand, the moral or philosophical approach focuses on what it 
means to be human, which implies a capability of reflective action and morality. 
Donnelly’s stance combines both the scientific and the moral and philosophical 
interpretations, establishing that the purpose of human rights is to guarantee what is 
needed for a life of dignity rather than just survival. Consequently, this requires the 
fulfillment of the most basic human needs (scientific approach) and more (moral and 
philosophical approach). Donnelly’s justification for human rights has to do with human 
nature and the moral account of human possibility, emphasizing what “human beings 
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might become, not what they have been historically or ‘are’ in some scientifically 
determinable sense.”14 Therefore, human rights are founded on the idea that human 
beings are ‘by nature’ suited to a life of dignity. Consequently, detainees should also have 
the opportunity at a dignified life while under detention. This is exactly where human 
rights play a central role. They ensure that the entitlements specified by the underlying 
theory of human nature are universally implemented and enforced so everyone can 
realize their dignity as such.15 
Donnelly argues that human rights are especially needed when they are not 
effectively guaranteed by national law and practice.16 Since human rights empower as 
well as benefit their holders, in an ideal scenario the relationship between right-holders 
and duty-bearers is highly controlled by the right-holders themselves.17 The subject of 
this thesis is just one piece of evidence that this ideal scenario rarely comes to fruition in 
practice. In fact, Donnelly labels human rights as “the language of victims and the 
dispossessed.”18 Consequently, human rights claims aim at altering legal or political 
practices and structures so that it is no longer necessary to claim those rights as human 
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rights. This highlights the importance of human rights as the most fundamental type of 
rights in the sense that they make claims for the entitlements necessary to live a life of 
dignity.19 
The origin of human rights is still highly contested. Although in theory there is 
much discussion about what is right or wrong, almost all states acknowledge the 
existence of universal human rights regardless of nationality, and religious and cultural 
practices. Furthermore, despite the lack of a philosophical consensus, an international 
legal and political consensus has been established. This is best exemplified by the list of 
rights in the UDHR and the International Human Rights Covenants.20 For instance, the 
basic idea of dignity has been legally and politically appropriated by the international 
community. As a result the rights recognized in these instruments originate from the 
inherent dignity of the human person.21 Article 6 of the UDHR presents this clearly, 
expressing that one must be recognized as a person in order to be treated with any sort of 
concern or respect.22 Even though the universality of such rights is also highly debated, 
these documents are perceived as the core of the present human rights regime. 
Nevertheless, the international legal and political consensus draws theoretical support 
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 Ibid., 25. 
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 Ibid., 24. 
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from a widely-accepted philosophical account which notes the requirement that the state 
treat each person with equal concern and respect.23 In other words, the state is perceived 
as the default and primary proprietor of human rights within the international system. 
This thesis follows the state-centric model in the sense that the state is indeed perceived 
to be the principal proprietor of human rights. 
The current practice of international human rights fits in between the statist and 
cosmopolitan models and is known as the internationalist model. The statist model sees 
human rights as principally a matter of sovereign national jurisdiction. Donnelly defines 
sovereignty as the attribute of states which establishes that there is no higher power than 
the state itself. Currently, international relations is structured around the legal idea that 
states have “exclusive jurisdiction over their territory, its occupants and resources, and 
the events that take place there.”24 The basic norms, rules, and practices of contemporary 
international relations rest on state sovereignty and the equality of all sovereign states.25 
For statists, there is no significant, independent international community, and certainly no 
international body with the right to act on behalf of human rights. Therefore, an 
international system exists, but not necessarily an international society.26 On the other 
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hand, a cosmopolitan model starts with individuals rather than states, which according to 
Donnelly, are often perceived as the problem. Cosmopolitans see the state challenged 
both from below, by individuals and NGOs, and from above, by the global community. 
They see intervention in the face of gross and persistent violations of human rights 
without any remorse. International society, in other words, is seen as a global or world 
society.27 Both of these models emphasize the role of the state in the promotion, 
provision, and protection of human rights. There is an international human rights regime, 
yet its consolidation is mainly hindered by the fact that this same international system is 
also state-centric. 
While the internationalist and current model establishes that the international 
community consists of essentially the society of states, the present human rights regime 
consists of a “weak” internationalist model with modest international societal constraints 
on state sovereignty.28 Presently, in both national practice and international law, duties to 
protect and aid fall almost exclusively on the state. The current human rights system is 
one of national implementation.29 Although human rights are held universally (by all 
human beings), implementation and enforcement lie with states, which have duties to 
protect and aid only their own citizens (and certain others under their territorial 
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jurisdiction). Neither states nor any other actors have legal rights or obligations to protect 
or aid victims in other jurisdictions (with the limited exception of genocide). 
Since states are the principal enforcers and protectors of human rights, rule of law 
is central to achieving the fulfillment of these responsibilities. The literature on the rule of 
law and human rights emphasize the importance of an independent judiciary. According 
to Shapiro (1981) cited in Gibler and Randazzo (2011), judicial independence exists 
when a neutral third party impartially resolves conflict.30 Since the judiciary is 
responsible for maintaining the rule of law (i.e. interpreting the constitution), it plays a 
central role in ensuring that political leaders do not act in complete disregard for statutory 
and constitutional law.31  Therefore, an independent judiciary is essential to maintaining 
an impartial rule of law. 
Moreover, most countries recognize many of these international human rights in 
their national legal systems as well. Consequently, the same rights are often guaranteed 
on several levels.32 Human rights are also emerging as an international political standard 
of legitimacy. Once citizens no longer need to assert their rights regularly; their 
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governments are likely to be considered fully legitimate in the contemporary world.33 For 
Donnelly (2007) it is clear that there are powerful practical reasons for adopting the list 
of human rights in the UDHR and the Covenants, since doing so reduces international 
shaming.34 
 The future of international human rights activity can be seen as a struggle over 
balancing the competing claims of sovereignty and international human rights and the 
competing conceptions of legitimacy that they imply.35 
The theoretical literature on human rights is useful because it demonstrates a 
simple fact; that is that detainees are human beings and thus, they have human rights. It 
also highlights the tensions that exist between the international and state levels within this 
internationalist model of human rights. Venezuela is a good case that somaticizes this. 
Although international guidelines are infused into regional and national guidelines, there 
is a disconnect when it comes to bringing these norms and principles to fruition. 
Defining Pre-trial Preventive Detention 
Pre-trial preventive detention refers to the neutralization of the supposed 
dangerousness of an individual through the temporary imprisonment of this individual 
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until confirmation of the conviction.36 Paul H. Robinson’s article entitled “Punishing 
Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice” (2009), evaluates the 
American criminal justice system. Robinson argues that the American criminal justice 
system, has taken on an additional preventive function, and therefore, is no longer just a 
purely punitive system. For Robinson, the appropriation of preventive measures into the 
traditional American criminal justice system has transcended the criminal justice system’s 
duties. In doing so, it has also created an aberrant form of preventive detention measures, 
which take the form of punitive procedures instead of the restraining measures 
characteristic of preventive detention. 
Robinson links punishment to a past wrong, while dangerousness to a threat of 
future harm.  Therefore, he concludes that dangerous individuals could be restrained, 
detained, or incapacitated, but that logically, dangerousness is not punishable.37 
Therefore, if a person is detained for the benefit of society, the conditions of detention 
cannot be punitive; the preventive detainee experiences an intrusion of liberty for the 
benefit of society and unlike a convicted prisoner, does not meet the standards for 
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punishment.38 It is for this reason that the author argues the American criminal justice 
system is a contradiction. 
Robinson perceives that the use of the criminal justice system as the principal 
mechanism for preventing future crimes is distorting the traditional goals of the American 
institutions of justice.39 He argues for segregation between the criminal justice system 
and the preventive system. Consequently, the criminal justice system would focus on 
imposing punishment for past offenses, and the other would be a post-sentence civil 
commitment system that considers the protection of society from future offenses by a 
determined dangerous offender.40 As a result, each system has more legitimacy, achieves 
its objectives, and encompasses the correct population for the intended individuals. 
Although, pre-trial preventive detention is generally known simply as preventive 
detention, since there are also other forms of this measure that can take place after trial 
(for instance, past offenders with convictions who are newly accused or continue to be 
perceived as dangerous). This thesis is solely focusing on the pretrial aspect of preventive 
detention.  
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For Robinson, a rational preventive detention system would determine the present 
dangerousness of an individual in a setting for detention for a limited period 
(approximately six months) and periodically re-evaluate the decision of whether the need 
for detention continues.41 Furthermore, according to Robinson, a rational preventive 
system would also follow a principle of minimum intrusion.42 
Renzo Orlandi (2012) argues that three principles must always be taken into 
account in order to be lawful and fall within the guidelines of practical rationality when 
considering preventive detention (which legislative choices that restrict individual rights 
must follow).43 The principles of legality, proportionality, and judicial review. The 
principle of legality has to do with the notion of dangerousness. Dangerousness, in this 
sense, does not have to be connected to a possible crime, safety simply has to appear to 
be at serious risk.44 The principle of proportionality claims that preventive measures must 
be adopted with the aim of preventing serious risks and not to avoid the commission of an 
offense.45 Furthermore, the duration of preventive measures should be reasonably brief; 
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only the needed amount of time to provide solutions to deal with the predicted danger.46 
The judicial review principle, as its name suggests, states that every measure of 
preventive detention should be subject to judicial review since it is not necessarily a 
judge’s responsibility to make such decisions.47 
Criminology in Latin America 
This section will be dedicated to the understanding of regional struggles with 
preventive detention. A particular emphasis is placed on the most basic characteristics of 
the criminal justice systems in Latin America and the effects of these on the integrity of 
preventive detention. 
Rosa del Olmo’s work entitled “The Development of Criminology in Latin 
America” (1999) is important because it highlights that, from the very beginning of the 
formation of the criminal justice system, prisons in Latin America emerged as centers for 
punishment rather than rehabilitory spaces. In fact, Del Olmo demonstrates that 
criminology was developed from the positivist science known initially as criminal 
anthropology and was spread to Latin America from its origins in Italy as early as in the 
1870s. According to Del Olmo, criminal anthropology became well-accepted throughout 
the Latin American region because it stressed physical and mental differences between 
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criminals and noncriminals. This type of thinking, the author argues, legitimated the 
racism that was emerging in Latin America at the end of the 19th century.48 Therefore, 
criminal anthropology justified the presence of criminals in those countries and it is no 
surprise that Indians and blacks were considered to be the region’s first criminals, 
followed by immigrants. These groups were labeled ‘degenerate’ due to supposed innate 
inferior traits.49 
The distinct racial prejudice among numerous other shortcomings which 
hampered the purpose of rehabilitation in the penitentiary system, called for drastic 
improvements in the criminal procedure during the 1990s.  The highly racist punitive 
systems continued to persist until, according to Claudio Fuentes Maureira in his essay 
“Régimen de Prisión Preventiva en America Latina: La Pena Anticipada, la Lógica 
Cautelar y la Contrarreforma” (2010), major criminal procedure reforms took place 
throughout Latin America to diminish the use of preventive detention as it was, and 
redefined it along the basic established international human rights guidelines. However, 
by the beginning of the 2000s these reforms were almost disregarded, and in fact, 
counterbalanced with a series of counter-reforms. Fuentes Maureira labeled these second-
time reforms as “counter-reforms” because criminal codes had either been changed back 
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to their strictly punitive character or had consistently been interpreted in such terms, even 
after the initial reforms. 
César Fortete and José Daniel Cesano in “Punitive Attitudes in Latin America” 
(2009), help place the changes explained by Fuentes Maureira (2010) into a larger 
regional context. At the same time that the criminal codes were being re-evaluated 
throughout the region, there was an increase in crime and violence. Consequently, it is 
easy to understand why Fuentes Maureira argues that the reform and counter-reforms of 
the criminal justice procedures in the region predominantly took place as a result of 
legislators seeking for ways to meet the demands of citizens in regards to public safety, 
establish a “harsh hand” against criminal behavior and delinquency, all while 
strengthening the state’s image, especially as an efficient entity when it comes to matters 
of criminal prosecution.50 
Interestingly, it is Fortete and Cesano (2009) who also mention the potential 
danger of increased crime and violence for the quality of the region’s relatively new 
democratic institutions, especially given Latin America’s history of military dictatorships 
which used domestic security and public safety as a basis of their legitimacy. Fortete and 
Cesano fear exactly what Fuentes Maureira (2010) described as the reasons why the 
criminal code reforms and counter-reforms took place. The lack of legitimacy and trust 
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found throughout Latin American countries in their criminal justice systems further 
exacerbates this emerging fear among Latin Americans, creating a cycle of violence in 
which both delinquents and the state are perpetrators. 
Criminology in Venezuela 
Just as the region was experiencing rising crime and violence in the 1990s, 
Venezuela also suffered from the same. Carmen Alguíndigue and Rogelio Pérez Perdomo 
in “La Prisión Preventiva en Tiempos de Revolución (Venezuela 1998-2008)” (2008), 
argue that the 1980s and 1990s in Venezuela were characterized by a rising crime wave in 
conjunction with feelings of discontent with the penal mechanisms of the state (as in the 
police and the criminal justice system).51 According to Alguíndigue and Pérez Perdomo, 
at the time, the nature of an irrelevant inquisitive penal process was responsible for the 
high percentage of unconvicted detainees. This indirectly lengthened the duration for 
which individuals awaited their sentencing while in prison.52 Therefore, due to the 
widespread discontent with the pre-exiting system, the state took on some UN 
recommendations which suggested a change towards an adversarial penal process. The 
adversary system holds that the accused must be free until his/her conviction. Other 
structural changes focused predominantly on improving the general speed of the penal 
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process.53 Therefore, Venezuela, with the UN’s advice, changed its old penal code dating 
to 1926 to a new Organic Code of Criminal Procedure in 1998.54 
These changes were meant to make justice fast, prisons solely for convicted 
individuals, as well as creating a system that met the international standard human rights 
guidelines.55 Since Chávez came into power in 1999, he made sure to continue this 
project and follow the legislative changes, and invested great amounts of funds into 
infrastructure and new technologies.56 Alguíndigue and Pérez Perdomo argue that 
regardless of all the changes, the system continues to take an inquisitive form. The reform 
was interpreted in a way that is reminiscent of the inquisitive process.57 In particular, the 
reforms of the Venezuelan Organic Code of Criminal Procedure in the years of 2000, 
2001, 2006, and 2008 have included changes in the extensions in the allotted two year 
time maximum for preventive detention, due to exceptions as well as extension of hours 
before a detainee case can be presented to a judge. Again, the Venezuelan case is a local 
illustration of the counter-reforms that Fuentes Maureira discussed. 
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The intent of the aforementioned reforms was not completely satisfied.  Although 
Alguíndigue and Pérez Perdomo highlight that the Código Orgánico Procesal Penal 
placed freedom at the forefront, emphasizing the exceptional character of preventive 
detention measures, Alguíndigue and Pérez Perdomo argue that this  has become second 
in importance to penal efficiency as described Francisco Ferreira de Abreu in “El Valor 
Libertad en un Proceso Penal Eficiente. Prioridades y Realidades de la Segunda Reforma 
del Código Orgánico Procesal Penal” (2003). 
Alguíndigue and Pérez Perdomo (2008) also mention how the judicial system is 
expected to serve the revolutionary process.58 Another essay by Rogelio Pérez Perdomo 
entitled “Derecho y Cultura Juridica en Venezuela en Tiempos de Revolución (1999-
2009)” (2009) discusses this same issue. His focus is the law and legal culture in 
Venezuela during the Chávez administration. Pérez Perdomo defines legal culture as the 
attitudes, opinions, as well as behaviors of citizens, government functionaries, and 
lawyers that reveal a conceptualization of the law and its positioning within society.59 
According to the author, changes in the legal culture can help explain the functioning of 
the legal system more than formal laws and the organization of the legal system could.60 
He argues that there is a new legal culture in Venezuela since 1999, when Chávez took 
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office. In this new legal culture, law is no longer perceived as a separate entity but is 
instead expected to serve the revolution.61 According to Pérez Perdomo, there is currently 
a political character to law, when clearly there should not be. 
Much along the same lines, Mark Ungar in his essay entitled “Prisons and Politics 
in Contemporary Latin America” (2003), has made an attempt to describe influence of 
politics and the administration on criminal justice. He argues that regardless of the 
improvements many of the Latin American governments have sought to enforce in 
regards to their prison systems since the 1990s, inefficient criminal justice systems, poor 
policy administration, and rising crime rates leading to greater detention powers on 
behalf of the police, continue to undermine these reforming efforts.62 In the political 
sense, these officials experience professional uncertainty and institutional pressures that 
lead to abuse and neglect of the new policies and laws. Therefore, Ungar argues that 
administratively reformed laws and policies need a higher level of institutional 
accountability and cooperation than is currently available.63 
Both Ungar and Pérez Perdomo (2009) raise a very important point, mentioning 
that not only do the present criminal justice structures throughout Latin America violate 
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human rights, but perhaps more seriously, they also show the central weaknesses in 
contemporary Latin American democracies.64 The need for a “hard hand” policy on crime 
shows the little self-confidence and legitimacy of government institutions that are 
supposed to protect citizens and promote citizenship. 
Alguíndigue and Pérez Perdomo (2008) argue that there is a gap in the literature, 
especially since the government never followed-up on the many legislative and structural 
changes made. Therefore, it is a very difficult task to determine whether these reforms 
have improved the penal situation in Venezuela, particularly in the case of preventive 
detention.65 Furthermore, there are also problems with official statistics, detainees are 
now being held in municipal and state police stations, as a consequence of the national 
penitentiary system being filled to its capacity. For that reason, there are no official 
numbers for those detained in local police stations outside of the national prison system.66 
Nevertheless, the majority of the work on the criminal justice system and its 
components in Venezuela has been focused on the penitentiary crisis, predominantly on 
its most visible manifestations including issues like the prison conditions and not on 
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larger but less visible structural problems. The excessive unnecessary use of preventive 
detention is a consequence of these less visible structural problems. 
In sum, the theoretical literature by Donnelly on human rights highlights the 
universality of these rights as well as the state’s responsibilities to enforce and protect 
these rights within an internationalist human rights system. The chapter also emphasized 
how the use of pre-trial preventive detention can redefine traditional criminal justice 
systems into aberrant forms. Yet the section on the development of criminology in Latin 
America and Venezuela explains why such measures as pre-trial preventive detention are 
common place in the region; this is due to the highly punitive nature of the region’s 
criminal justice systems.  
34 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Venezuelan Historical-Political Context 
This chapter highlights the Chávez administration’s emphasis on human rights 
and is a good precursor to understanding why the penitentiary crisis was perhaps not a 
top-level priority, especially during the first years of the Bolivarian government. 
Consequently, I argue that the penitentiary crisis in Venezuela is brought about an inept 
criminal justice system whose functioning (or lack thereof) further exacerbates 
overcrowding in penitentiary facilities as well as violates the most basic human rights. I 
also want to emphasize that the criminal justice system has been dysfunctional even prior 
to the Chávez administration, yet the human rights focus of this government leads to 
some confusion as to why this issue was not a top priority. 
A main component contributing to the penitentiary crisis in Venezuela is the 
unintentional (mis)use of pre-trial preventive detention which continues to inject 
individuals into an inept system. This chapter is central to understanding the positive 
impact the Chávez administration had on human rights in general. But, it also facilitates 
in assessing the administration’s shortfalls, specifically when it comes to the (mis)use of 
pre-trial preventive detention. 
This chapter begins with a description of the circumstances which led to the rise 
of Chávez. The following sections describe the central changes that occurred once 
Chávez took the presidency, including the vast changes in social and political rights, and 
35 
human rights in general. The chapter concludes with a brief overview of a HRW report 
from 2008 which depicts many of the conventional views on the administration. 
From Puntofijismo to Chavismo 
By the early 1960s, Venezuela was perceived to be different from the rest of Latin 
America. As explained by Dick Parker in “Chávez and the Search for an Alternative to 
Neoliberalism” (2005), Venezuela was believed to be “immune” to the region’s constant 
political and social instability.67 The establishment of the democratic era in Venezuela 
was brought about with the Pacto de Punto Fijo of 1958 (Punto Fijo Agreement), a power 
sharing arrangement between the two principal political parties Acción Democrática 
(AD) and Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI).  
Venezuela’s newly established democracy quickly led to the formation of an 
“exceptionalism thesis,” priding Venezuela’s state-sponsored industrialization model all 
within the framework of democratic institutions, making the nation a beacon of light in 
the midst of darkness.68 In fact, according to Steve Ellner and Miguel Tinker Salas in 
“Introduction: The Venezuelan Exceptionalism Thesis: Separating Myth from Reality” 
(2005), the Venezuelan exceptionalism thesis consisted of three basic formulations: (1) 
Venezuela was privileged with respect to the rest of Latin America; (2) Venezuela 
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remained free of the critical conflicts and cleavages that threatened political stability in 
the rest of the region; and (3) Venezuela’s democratic system and political culture were 
healthy and solid.69  
Venezuela’s privileged standing, basic formulation number one,  arose out of 
many different factors, including its status as a Third World oil producing country which 
was relatively safe from the political turmoil prevalent in most of the other Third World 
oil producing countries (particularly those located in the Middle East). The fact that 
Venezuelan territory is rich in many other raw materials like natural gas, iron, gold, 
diamonds, and bauxite, also places it in a privileged position.70 
Regarding the second basic formulation of the Venezuelan exceptionalism thesis, 
the country remained free of conflicts and cleavages that have threatened political 
instability in the region because Venezuela has historically had greater social mobility in 
comparison to other Latin American countries. This is due to Venezuela’s marginal 
importance during colonial times which consequently, did not allow for the consolidation 
of Spanish (cultural) colonialism which was exceedingly hierarchical. The authors also 
argue that the nation’s aristocracy was almost completely decimated by the civil wars that 
took place in the 1800s, and unlike the militaries of other Latin American states, the 
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Venezuelan army after independence ceased to be the exclusive domain of the upper 
classes.71 Moreover, in Venezuela there was an absence of a strong nationalism unlike in 
many other countries in Latin America which had led to armed conflict and economic 
disruption in those countries. 
The third and final basic formulation regarding Venezuela’s solid and healthy 
democratic system and political culture refers to Venezuela’s protracted democracy that 
emerged in 1958. This spared Venezuela the military dictatorships that dominated the rest 
of the region from the 1960s to the 1980s.72 Consequently, Venezuela was perceived as 
the exception to political instability, unpredictability, and violence. 
Although hailed for its democratic institutions and processes, Venezuelan 
democracy did not establish itself by fully democratic means. The first undemocratic 
instance can be perceived in the political pact of Punto Fijo itself, which pushed the 
communist party aside from any discussion even though it also had a leadership role in 
the struggle against the military dictatorship of General Marcos Pérez Jimenez (1952-
1958).73 Many more undemocratic manifestations developed throughout the years of the 
Punto Fijo Pact, all eventually adding up and leading to massive discontent, and 
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ultimately proving the exceptionalism thesis wrong. The Caracazo or Sacudón is the 
perfect example of just this. 
The Caracazo was a large social protest that emerged from the urban poor sector 
of Caracas on February 27 and 28 of 1989.74 This so-called violent shake, as implied by 
the name Sacudón, involved Caracas and most of the main and secondary cities of the 
country, all of which experienced barricades, road closures, the burning of vehicles, the 
stoning of shops, shooting, and widespread looting.75 The reasons for the Caracazo burst 
are attributed to Venezuela’s deceptive democracy. In fact, Margarita López Maya, in 
“The Venezuelan ‘Caracazo’ of 1989: Popular Protest and Institutional Weakness” (2003), 
describes the Caracazo as a popular revolt carried out by a society that did not have 
adequate channels of communication with its government.76 The Caracazo was also 
ignited by a financial collapse, headed by the democratic puntofijista regime. 
At the end of the 1980s Venezuela experienced a deep economic crisis, in part 
brought about the decrease in world oil prices beginning in 1983 as explained by José 
Honorio Martínez, in “Causas e Interpretaciones del Caracazo” (2009). For instance, 
while a barrel of Venezuelan oil was worth 28.9 dollars in 1973, by 1986 this price had 
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decreased to 10.9 dollars. This, in addition to the growing foreign debt obtained in 1975 
through 1978, which increased from six billion dollars to thirty-one billion dollars, placed 
the state in a fiscal crisis. Oil revenues represented an average 72 percent of the total 
revenue obtained by the Venezuelan state between 1972 and 1982,77 therefore, it is quite 
understandable how a 62.2 percent decrease in oil rents from 1973 to 1986 could lead to a 
financial crisis of great proportions, inhibiting the state to deal with its expected domestic 
expenditures, and much less with its foreign debt obligations. In two instances, February 
of 1983 and December of 1988, the Venezuelan government declared a moratorium on its 
foreign debt.78 Furthermore, this economic crisis was complimented with a massive 
escape of capital. For instance between the end of 1982 and the first six months of 1983, 
five billion dollars were taken out of the country.79 
Honorio Martínez highlights the puntofijista regime’s favoritism towards what he 
labeled an “industrial and commercial bourgeoisie” which received important public 
resources.80 When the first of a series of currency devaluations took place in February of 
1983, driving the bolívar from 4.3 to 7 bolívares per dollar;81 the government of Luis 
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Herrera Campins (1979-1984), on that same year created a fund to assist the business 
sector with its accumulated debts, providing entrepreneurs and businessmen with a 
preferential currency exchange rate of 4.3 bolívares per dollar versus the official 
exchange rate of 7 bolívares per dollar.82 
These circumstances further pushed the Venezuelan state into a vicious cycle of 
loan-seeking and debt. In fact, the state looked into the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) to resolve the economic crisis, and in 1986 the government of President Jaime 
Lusinchi launched the first package of economic measures to achieve a refinancing of the 
foreign debt.83 According to Honorio Martínez, accepting neoliberal policies implied 
putting down certain mechanisms of redistribution of oil revenues, which had contributed 
to the stability and legitimacy of the political regime. Honorio Martínez explains that the 
Punto Fijo Pact established the guarantee of access to the surplus revenue coming from 
oil sales through free public services such as health and education, the subsidy of certain 
staple foods as well as basic supplies for public transport, as well as the distribution of 
energy.84 Furthermore, both AD and COPEI supported the model of import substitution 
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and government intervention in the economy, factors that enhanced the legitimacy of the 
puntofijista regime and the popularity of these proestablishment political leaders.85  
Carlos Andres Pérez’s second term from 1989 to 1993 had a political cabinet 
filled with students of the Instituto Económico Superior de Administración (IESA), which 
according to Honorio Martínez, was an academic space for neoliberalism.86 On the 
February 16, 1989, only a month after Carlos Andres Pérez took power, the president 
accepted a new IMF package of 4,500 million dollars in loans that also came with IMF 
conditionalities. These conditions included the restriction on public expenditure and 
salaries, monetary and currency exchange liberalization, progressive elimination of tariffs 
on imports, liberalization of the prices of all goods with the exemption of 18 belonging to 
the basic food basket, increase in public service rates (telephone, water, electricity, and 
gas), and finally, an increase in the prices of products derived from petroleum, with a 100 
percent increase in gasoline and a 30 percent increase in public transport rates.87 To place 
the economic crisis in perspective, by the end of 1988 food prices had already increased 
by 60 percent in comparison to prices in 1985.88 According to Bernardo Alvarez Herrera, 
Venezuela’s Ambassador to the United States since 2003, in the aftermath of the 
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structural reforms instituted in 1989 by the Pérez administration, the percentage of 
Venezuelans living in extreme poverty jumped from 43.9 to 66.5 percent in a single 
year.89  
All of these circumstances led to the massive disenchantment and outrage played 
out during the days of February 27 and 28, 1989. Although there had been anti-neoliberal 
protests in Merida as well as other cities prior to February 27,90 the Caracazo shocked the 
nation, due to its extension and violence, and proved the institutional weakness of the 
puntofijista regime. 
The Caracazo took shape after failed negotiations between the Cámara del 
Transporte (Transport Chamber) and the government. When the Transport Chamber 
asked the government for an increase of 70 percent for public transport rates (due to an 
increase of 100 percent in gasoline prices) and the government declined the request, only 
allowing a 30 percent price increase, the association summoned a strike on February 27.91 
Some of the bus drivers that did not go through with the strike, decided to, instead, set 
their own prices, an act that led to a violent response from the public transport users.92 
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This in turn, led the urban poor, the most marginalized sectors of Caracas and the 
metropolitan area, in addition to students, to take to the streets to demonstrate against the 
overall price hikes as well as the shortages brought about the recently authorized 
macroeconomic package.93 
The Plan Avila was launched on the same day the massive strike, protest, and 
looting began as a means to regain public order, via the national armed forces. President 
Pérez declared a state of emergency and a curfew. On February 28 at 4p.m. the Minister 
of the Interior declared a suspension of all constitutional guarantees and during the next 
day and half, the armed forces stormed the city of Caracas, leaving death on its path.94 
Honorio Martínez (2009) finds that the estimates of the deaths that occurred during the 
Caracazo range from 300 to over 2,000, depending on the sources (official versus 
unofficial, respectively).95 
López Maya (2003) believes that the Caracazo took the shape that it did, 
transforming itself from a massive strike-to a protest-to the ransacking of shops was due 
to the Venezuelan state’s institutional weakness. According to López Maya, the protestors 
found themselves for hours in a public space where there was no restraint or control by 
the authorities. As a result the masses turned on the shops as they have always done in the 
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past in such circumstances of institutional weakness or a “vacuum” of authority.96 
Furthermore, López Maya argues that if the political actors and unions had been in tune 
with their constituencies, they could have foreseen the trouble arising from the 
presidential announcement of the macroeconomic adjustment.97 Moreover, López Maya 
also argues that government institutions themselves showed great weakness. First, the 
government failed to make public transport drivers comply with the agreements they had 
signed. Second, the police was not prepared to deal with the first outbreaks of civil 
disobedience effectively. Third, the national government made almost no efforts to build 
a minimum consensus before making the neoliberal package announcements. Fourth, it 
did not study the implications such structural adjustment measures could have had in the 
country during a time of deep economic crisis and socio-political frustrations.98  
The deadly riots of the Caracazo in February of 1989 were a popular backlash 
directly related to the structural reforms and indirectly related to the puntofijista regime. 
The two coup attempts of 1992, the first led by then Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez 
and the other by another group of military-men, were also expressions of the general 
discontent with the ultra-neoliberal bipartite democratic system at the time. 
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After the failed coup attempt, Chávez appeared on national television 
acknowledging the defeat of his military insurrection but claimed that it was only for the 
time being that his movement could not achieve its objectives.99 Chávez accepted sole 
responsibility for the failed coup and impressed Venezuelans who were accustomed to 
politicians circumventing accountability.100 Chávez was imprisoned in 1992 and after two 
years, he was pardoned by the Rafael Caldera administration in 1994. 
The attempted coup of February 4, 1992 placed Chávez under the national 
spotlight, in which he appeared to be a possible source of change. Yet, Venezuelan 
political scientist Luis Gómez Calcaño (2000), as quoted by Parker (2005), stated that 
despite the widespread recognition of the existence of a political crisis in the country: 
The only alternative discourse seemed to be that of ‘modernization,’ understood 
as the replacement of political parties by civil society, of ideology by 
pragmatism, of utopias by technocratic thinking, and of the state by the 
market…Very few thought that the force capable of displacing Acción 
Democrática (AD) and COPEI [the traditionally dominant parties] would be 
[Chavismo].101  
But, in fact, Chávez’s rise to power represented a refutation of the exceptionalism 
thesis and a repudiation of neoliberalism.102 While in prison, Chávez received 
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substantial support from Venezuelans, in grand part due to his willingness to take 
responsibility for his actions. Quickly after having received amnesty, Chávez 
began a campaign that denied any association with the traditional political parties, 
encouraged the creation of a new constitution as well as a radical departure from 
the economic policies proposed by the IMF and the World Bank. He successfully 
rallied massive support from the Venezuelan public.103 According to Damarys 
Canache in “From bullets to ballots: the emergence of popular support for Hugo 
Chávez” (2002), a key component to Chávez’s electoral win was the existence of 
an early foundation of popular support which came about after the coup attempt. 
In fact, the author recalls how many of Venezuelans rallied for Chávez’s release 
from prison after his failed coup attempt.104 Chávez won the 1998 presidential 
election with a 56.2 percent of the vote, he was perceived by the people as a 
“political outsider”105 and, as a result, as a complete rupture from the puntofijista 
regime, of the old politics. 
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The Emergence of the Fifth Republic 
Since Chávez took the presidency in 1999, the administration has made 
“correcting long-standing social ills” and encouraging the participation of Venezuelans to 
direct their future, central to the Bolivarian government’s policies.106 The 1999 amended 
constitution is a great example of the earliest, and perhaps most fundamental, attempt to 
head the country towards a new direction and fulfill the Bolivarian government’s two 
main objectives. In fact, the emergence of the Fifth Republic came about with the 
development of the constitutional changes that took place within the first year of 
Chávez’s presidency, which significantly redefined Venezuelan citizenship and 
democracy. As described by Alvarez Herrera, the new Constitution of the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela “broadened the definition of rights and responsibilities, expanded 
political participation, and encouraged Venezuelans to become more active stakeholders 
in the country’s political, economic, and social development.”107 Moreover, not only did 
the new constitution redefine citizenship, but it also gave a new definition to the nature 
and role of the state as a participatory space, in addition to being a central guarantor of 
social rights.108 
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According to Hans-Jurgen Burchardt in “A Missionary and His Missions. 
Progress and Obstacles in Venezuela’s New Social Policies” (2009), the Bolivarian 
Constitution of 1999 is integrated by three components: (1) The promotion of social 
citizenship based on the universalization of social rights and excluding all forms of 
discrimination; (2) the creation of social justice as the first goal of the social and 
economic order; and (3) the formation of public policy as a space for the participation of 
all citizens.109 Therefore, the new Constitution promoted activism in all fronts—social, 
economic, and political. 
Michael Walzer (1995) reminds us that contemporary democracies do not make 
politics accessible to the people as in Rousseau's ideal Republican community. 
Consequently, citizenship today is predominantly a passive role only 
requiring/encouraging participation when voting is concerned.110 Regardless of the fact 
that citizenship is currently passive, Walzer argues that the state has to be open to 
citizens’ indefinite/unstated/occasional involvement.111 He argues that it is in the 
associational networks of civil society, as in unions, political parties, interest groups, 
among others, where passive citizenship can become active citizenship through smaller 
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decision-making opportunities that contribute to shaping parts of the state and the 
economy.112 According to Alvarado Chacín (2009), the Bolivarian government has 
generated new organizational spaces for community action through which the popular 
sectors can organize and manage directly public policies, by designing and executing 
their own community projects and administering their own budgets.113 The Bolivarian 
social missions, created by the Chávez administration in 2003, are an example of these 
newly demarcated organizational spaces for community action. 
Moreover, according to Alvarez Herrera (2006), Venezuelans have participated in 
numerous elections since Chávez took office.114 In fact, the idea of constitutional reform 
was proposed to and approved by the Venezuelan people through a referendum. 
Furthermore, the amended constitution was ratified by Venezuelans as well through 
popular vote.115 Citizen participation has undoubtedly increased in Venezuelan public 
life, voter turnouts in Venezuelan presidential elections since Chávez have increased 
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drastically, with the October 2012 presidential elections experiencing over 80 percent 
participation on behalf of the electorate.116  
As reflected by the increase in participation of citizens, there was also a distinct 
dichotomy between the political composition during Chávez’s presidency and that before 
1999.  Julia Buxton in “Venezuela’s Contemporary Political Crisis in Historical Context” 
(2005), finds that while the Fourth Republic, the historical period that preceded Chávez’s 
project (spanning from 1830 to 1999), excluded the radical left and the poor, the current 
system under Chávez, the Fifth Republic, excludes the politicians and beneficiaries of the 
Fourth Republic.117 Hence, demarcating a clear separation from the past, but, 
nevertheless, making the same mistake of excluding those outside of the bounds of the 
officialist band. Buxton argues that Chávez’s program negatively affected acquired 
interests of groups, parties, and organizations that had been favored by the Pact of Punto 
Fijo.118  
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Human Rights within the Context of the Bolivarian Revolution 
The majority of scholars agree that democracy is the most conducive system for 
the development of citizenship, civil society, and ultimately, human rights. This thesis 
follows this discourse and places a strong emphasis on democracy and democratic 
processes; they represent the context within which the subject of study develops and is 
engaged. Although the Chávez administration is consistently under scrutiny for the 
president’s strengthening of the executive, for the purpose of this thesis, Venezuela is 
presented strictly as a democratic system under Chávez. Especially since the bi-partite 
system experienced by Venezuela prior to the Chávez administration was internationally 
acknowledged as a strong democratic process, although power was formally concentrated 
in the hands of an oligarchy, then Chávez’s democracy cannot be too deviant from 
Venezuelan (and perhaps even international) standards of democracy in the first place. 
Also, taking into consideration Howard J. Wiarda’s (2004) definition of authoritarianism: 
A “top-down, absolutist, dictatorial control by one person, a military regime, an elite, a 
monopolistic political party,”119 the Chávez administration clearly does not fit this 
extreme. 
Instead, this thesis will focus on the actual language used by the government 
when it comes to defining its governance style. The Venezuelan state under the Chávez 
                                                 
 
 
 
119
 Howard J. Wiarda (ed.), Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America—Revisited 
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004), 3.  
52 
administration has taken the character of that of a participatory democracy according to 
government sources. Kirk A. Hawkins in Who Mobilizes? Participatory Democracy in 
Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution (2010), defines participatory democracy as the use of 
mass participation in the political decision-making process as a means of complimenting 
and sometimes even replacing the traditional institutions of elections and lobbying 
associated with representative democracy.120 Therefore, participatory democracy 
resembles direct democracy. 
With a participatory type of democracy, an active and engaged citizenship is 
needed. According to T. H. Marshall in his influential essay entitled Citizenship and 
Social Class (1949), the definition of citizenship is based on three major components: 
Civil, political, and social. The civil element is composed of individual freedom rights 
like liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property 
and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice.121 Political rights, on the other 
hand, involve the right to participate in political life, either as a member of a body 
invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body.122 
Finally, social rights are composed of a range of rights including the right to a minimum 
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of economic and social welfare and security to the right to share parts in the social 
heritage narrative.123 
This thesis concerns the definitions of each of these components of citizenship. It 
is clear that the Chávez administration has promoted and improved social rights before 
the other two. Although Marshall developed a chronology which established that civil 
rights evolved first, followed by political rights, and finally by social rights, the emphasis 
of this research is solely on the elements of citizenship as developed by Marshall. 
The Bolivarian social missions are the foundation of the socio-political context of 
the Chávez administration which seeks to address and tackle the social injustices that had 
been long ignored in Venezuelan society.124 According to Alvarez Herrera, government 
spending on social programs has risen significantly since Chávez took office, and it 
stands at approximately 15 percent of GDP (as of 2006).125 Furthermore, as of 2005, 15 
million Venezuelans, almost half the total population have received free health care 
through Misión Barrio Adentro.126 Another nine million Venezuelans have benefitted 
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from subsidized prices on basic foodstuffs through Misión Mercal.127 In addition, 
Venezuela also declared itself free from illiteracy in 2005, in large part due to the Ribas 
educational mission.128 The social missions, apart from addressing social problems were 
also formed with the intention of involving communities in the government’s social 
development program; inherently, the missions involve citizens in civil society. 
The Bolivarian Revolution and its social missions highlight an incongruence in 
the Bolivarian administration, since the promotion of human rights cannot just be focused 
on the social. The Chávez administration has also improved political rights in the sense 
that there has been political inclusion of previously marginalized sectors. Civil rights 
have most definitely improved in writing, but unlike social and political rights, they have 
not come to fruition. 
Human Rights Language in the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
The Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was developed by a 
National Constituent Assembly and approved by popular referendum on December 15, 
1999. According to a document produced by PROVEA analyzing the human rights found 
in the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the new constitution 
incorporated a series of juridical attributes present in modern international instruments 
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amplifying the catalogue of rights consecrated in the 1961 Constitution. This new 
constitution consecrates the universality and indivisibility of human rights. For instance 
articles 2 and 3 establish that any law approved by the Venezuelan state must respect and 
fit international human rights norms and principles and that the state’s primary goal is to 
respect human rights, respectively. In addition, articles 23, 152, and 154 outline that 
international human rights treaties ratified by the Venezuelan state are also 
constitutionally binding. Furthermore, Article 19 establishes that the state must guarantee 
human rights equally and without discrimination.  
Civil Rights 
Among the most relevant civil rights mentioned in the new Venezuelan 
constitution are: the right to life and complete prohibition of the death penalty (Article 
43); the right to due process (Article 49); the right to free movement (Article 50); the 
right to freedom of association (articles 52 and 118); the right to freedom of assembly 
(Article 53); and the right to freedom of speech but prohibition of anonymity (Article 57). 
Political Rights 
Political rights protected by the 1999 constitution include: the right to participate 
in public affairs (articles 41, 62, and 65); the right to vote (articles 63 and 64); the right of 
political association and participation in electoral processes (Article 67); and the right to 
public demonstrations as long as they are peaceful and without arms, in turn, authorities 
cannot use shotguns, pellet guns, or other firearms, nor tear gas or other toxic substances 
to control peaceful demonstrations (Article 68). 
56 
Social and Family Rights 
Social rights under the Bolivarian constitution include: the right to housing 
(Article 82); the right to free healthcare (Article 83); the right to social security (articles 
86 and 88); the right to work (Article 87); the protection of workers’ rights (articles 89, 
90, and 91); the right to unionization with job security (Article 95); and the right to go on 
strike (Article 97). 
International Perspective of Human Rights and the Bolivarian Revolution 
From the international view of protection and universality of the aforementioned 
rights, there has been a strong influence and control of international organizations on 
Venezuela, particularly those from the United States. This included association with 
organizations such as affiliate bodies of the OAS, with commissions recommending and 
submitting human rights cases to the court for review. Among recent developments, 
Venezuela no longer (since 2012) recognizes the IACHR or the sister organization, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. This is mainly due to the fact that the 
government cites the OAS and its human rights bodies as seeking to destabilize the 
country.129  
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A Decade under Chávez: The Human Rights Watch Report 
There has been widespread discussions on the human rights of the Chávez 
administration. The HRW report from September 2008 titled “A Decade under Chávez 
Political Intolerance and Lost Opportunities for Advancing Human Rights in Venezuela” 
best represents the nature of these discussions. A summary of the report findings note that 
the April 2002 coup was the first major blow to human rights protections established in 
the 1999 constitution. The coup in April 2002 led to the replacement of Chávez with an 
unelected president for less than two days. The temporary president within hours of 
holding office, suspended the legislature, dissolved the Supreme Court as well as the 
country’s democratic institutions. The report claims that ever since then, the government 
policies and practices have been shadowed by distinct discrimination and denouncing of 
critics as coup mongers as well as anti-democratic conspirators, all of which represents a 
disheveled state of rights as well as orderly and biased functioning of the state.130 
Moreover, the report also highlights that during the Chávez presidency there was 
a clear disregard for the separation of powers presented in the 1999 constitution 
symbolized by an independent judiciary for the crucial and basic protection of 
fundamental rights. Lacking this independence, the Chávez government practiced 
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discrimination in the form of policies and judgments thereby hampering the freedom of 
expression of journalists, freedom of association of workers as well as the civil society’s 
ability to promote human rights in the country.131 
This chapter sought to demonstrate the Chávez administration’s emphasis on 
human rights in general, and social rights in particular, and is a good precursor to the 
following chapter on the penitentiary crisis in Venezuela. By placing the focus 
predominantly on social and even political rights, the Chávez administration failed to 
promote some of the most basic human rights encompassed within civil rights. This 
chapter also facilitates in assessing the administration’s shortfalls regarding human rights 
concerns, specifically when it comes to the (mis)use of pre-trial preventive detention, 
keeping in mind that the criminal justice system has been dysfunctional since even prior 
to the Chávez administration.  
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Chapter 4: The Venezuelan Penitentiary Crisis in Focus 
The main argument of this thesis is that the penitentiary crisis in Venezuela is 
brought about an inept criminal justice system whose functioning (or lack thereof) further 
exacerbates overcrowding in penitentiary facilities as well as violates the most basic 
human rights. The unintentional (mis)use of pre-trial preventive detention is a main factor 
contributing to overcrowding in Venezuelan prisons. 
This chapter highlights the earliest and perhaps most ambitious project aimed at 
tackling the penitentiary crisis during the Chávez administration: The Penitentiary 
Humanization Program. Seeking to completely shift the system from that of a punitive 
one to a rehabilitation-focused system, the Penitentiary Humanization Program seeks to 
humanize prison facilities, as the program’s name suggests. This chapter is focused on 
providing an intensive look at the components of the program while also assessing the 
program’s relevance. 
The chapter first begins with an explanation of the perceptions of the penitentiary 
system on behalf of the general Venezuelan public as well as inmates. Then a description 
of the system’s actual conditions both before and during the Chávez administration 
follows. This chapter in particular demonstrates that the vast problems in the prisons have 
existed prior to the Chávez administration and are not consequences of the Bolivarian 
60 
Revolution. The chapter closes with an analysis of the Penitentiary Humanization 
Program. 
The Penitentiary Crisis and the Bolivarian Government’s Response 
Consuelo Cerrada Méndez, Director of the now dissolved National Penitentiary 
Services, described the current Venezuelan penitentiary system as being an inherited 
system. According to Cerrada Méndez, the Venezuelan penitentiary system was a 
governmental organism that had been completely forgotten and abandoned, and that had 
become equated with that of “a deposit for human beings.”132 
But dealing with the Venezuelan penitentiary crisis has become an increasingly 
important issue for the Chávez administration and the Bolivarian Revolution. In fact, the 
Chávez administration has made structural changes to the country’s prison system, 
particularly with its Penitentiary Humanization Program. However, even with these 
structural changes, human rights violations in Venezuelan prisons persist. I argue that the 
program has not been able to produce significant improvements because the problematic 
found in the penitentiary system is a result of a larger institutional problem: the 
inefficiencies stemming from an (overall) inadequate criminal justice system. 
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It is considered that the Chávez administration, during its second term, has 
undertaken an active stance in regards to solving the penitentiary crisis by consolidating 
efforts through the development of a government program. This section consists first of a 
discussion on how Venezuelans generally view the penitentiary system (what influences 
their judgments). Then, a description of the situation in Venezuelan prisons follows. 
Third, the Chávez administration’s Penitentiary Humanization Project is presented. 
Finally, an analysis of the Penitentiary Humanization Project and its impact on 
Venezuelan society is also provided. 
Philosophical Foundations and the Present Penitentiary Reality in Venezuela 
Roldan Tomasz Suárez Litvin in “El cáracter problemático de la situación 
penitenciaria venezolana: hacia una solución de fondo” (1999) sought to find an answer 
to the question: “Why is the current situation in Venezuelan prisons perceived as 
problematic?”133. Suárez Litvin found that there was a disconnect between the values of 
Venezuelan society and the reality in the prisons. He suggested that the solution to the 
penitentiary problem in Venezuela was simply the reunification of societal values and the 
penitentiary system.134 According to the author, there was a disjuncture between the 
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constitution135 and the penal code, the first following the post-modern rehabilitation 
model while the second taking a classic rational character.136 
Although Suárez Litvin’s study was published in 1999 and it strictly refers to the 
era prior to the Chávez presidency, major structural changes in the penitentiary system 
were not carried out until after 2005, with the declaration of the Penitentiary 
Humanization Program. Therefore, Suárez Litvin’s analysis of the causes of the 
penitentiary problem in Venezuela is justifiably a good foundation for understanding the 
general atmosphere in Venezuela prior to 1999 as well as in the 2000s. Suárez Litvin’s 
analysis will also provide some insight into the formation and composition of Chávez’s 
Penitentiary Humanization Project. But first, let’s discuss the philosophical foundations 
of modern definitions of penitentiary systems. 
Suárez Litvin’s description of a criminal justice system based on rationality 
highlights its exceedingly dichotomous character. It is important to remember that this 
system emerged from the influence of Enlightenment ideals of morality and rationality. 
Any elements different from these were considered deviant and, in fact, as the exact 
opposite.137 The model revolves around the principles of liberty and dignity, which are 
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perceived to be the foundation of human nature, and responsibility and justice, 
mechanisms that emphasize the individual’s agency (will) and the protection of their 
humanity.138 Responsibility is always defined in terms of morality, based on either good 
or ill will in a classic rational model. Hence, ill will is perceived as intolerable for the 
good will because it threatens the core of human nature, as mentioned previously, the 
concepts liberty and dignity.139 In this type of system, justice is solely sought through 
punishment.140 The rehabilitation model emerges from a critique of the 18th century 
model; because although the classic rational system advocated the protection of the 
human dignity, it did so only for non-deviants, those individuals considered good-
willed.141 The author argues that in such a system, like the classic rational model, 
individuals are used as a means of teaching others to respect human dignity, while 
evading the education of the actual subject.142 This last aspect also makes the classic 
rational model very different from a rehabilitation model. 
A rehabilitation system is supposedly based on strictly scientific facts about 
human nature and its main objective is to resocialize individuals who have deviated from 
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their particular society’s moral standards so that they can, eventually, function in 
society.143 This model emerged in the 19th century and is closely linked to scientific 
positivism, a movement which sought to study the human being based on its biological, 
psychic, and social components.144 Within a rehabilitation system perspective, it is 
believed that since moral standards are not innate, people must be socialized from a very 
early age.145 Human nature here is defined by the biological need to survive, and hence, 
humans, like all other animal species seek to maximize survival by organizing into 
cooperative groups or societies.146 However, the process of socialization is not enough to 
safeguard society and it is precisely for this reason that penal (sentencing) systems were 
created, to enforce the very moral standards that guide societies.147 Punishment, in this 
type of system, focuses on creating a conditioned negative response to the possibility of 
engaging in what would be considered a bad behavior.148 As a result, prisons in a 
rehabilitation system become therapeutic-like institutions managed by specialists ranging 
from doctors to anthropologists.149 Suárez Litvin mentioned that ironically, in this system 
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the individual is also dehumanized through punishment because in order to create the 
conditioned consciousness mentioned before, punishment needs to be performed in a 
public manner.150 
In other words, the rehabilitation model focuses on resocializing the individual so 
that he/she can be reintegrated into society.151 On the contrary, the classic rational model 
is based on talion law; a system that is founded solely on punishment.152 Furthermore, 
while the rehabilitation system is constructive, the classic rational system is not, yet 
nevertheless, both systems dehumanize individuals at one point or another. 
Suárez Litvin provides an analysis of Venezuelans’ moral judgments over the 
current prison crisis and the author argues that these judgments do not emerge from 
classic rational thought but rather, Venezuelans would find such a philosophy quite 
appalling, barbaric, and outdated.153 According to Suárez Litvin, Venezuelans oppose the 
idea of punishment, particularly because they view the classic rational type of 
punishment as having a hypocritical nature; a system in which inmates are punished in 
the name of a supposed moralist universal truth put in place by those in power.154 
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Furthermore, the Venezuelan penitentiary system is not criticized through a rehabilitation 
lens either.155 According to Suárez Litvin, Venezuelans fear that this system is misused by 
authorities because the resocialization process will most likely take the shape of the 
interests of those in power and hence, the system’s subtle nature could easily allow for 
authorities to use resocialization as a means to brainwash inmates.156 The author goes as 
far as to suggest that the deeper reason why Venezuelans are unhappy with their prison 
system is that they see the reflection of the unequal relationship in Venezuelan society in 
the prisons as well.157 The major problem in the Venezuelan penitentiary system is the 
fact that there is clearly an oppressive power relationship between authorities 
representative of a minority and those imprisoned, particularly because inmates tend to 
come from the lower socio-economic strata.158 In fact, the 1997 Human Rights Watch 
report mentioned a feeling of helplessness among Venezuelans who turned to authorities 
to fix the rising crime problem of the 1980s and 1990s; doubting their criminal justice 
system’s capacity and seeing no other violable options but  imprisonment. According to 
data from 2005, about 61.3 percent of inmates declared barrios or poverty-stricken 
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neighborhoods often times in the outskirts of cities, as their place of residence.159 Also, 
for that same year, it was registered that approximately 30 percent of inmates had primary 
education, 50 percent had secondary education, 3 percent had higher education, and the 
illiteracy rate among prisoners was eight percent.160  
In summary, Suárez Litvin (1999) suggests then that the major concern for 
Venezuelans when analyzing the prison situation is corruption. The inequalities in 
Venezuelan society and the disconnect between the general public and leaders are issues 
that are exacerbated in the nation’s prisons. Christopher Birkbeck and Neelie Pérez-
Santiago in “The character of penal control in Latin America: Sentence remissions in a 
Venezuelan prison” (2006) show how this sense of hopelessness (in the penitentiary 
system specifically) has been translated into the Venezuelan culture and language. 
Birkbeck and Pérez-Santiago’s study highlights the linguistic difference between 
English-speaking (industrialized) countries and Venezuela in which the expressions 
‘doing time’ and ‘discharging time’ are used, respectively, to refer to imprisonment.161 
The authors argue that while imprisonment in English speaking countries is equated with 
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time, in Venezuela, imprisonment is “something to be relieved rather than traversed.”162 
In other words, imprisonment is perceived as ‘discharging a sentence’ in Venezuela 
because it is understood that prisoners must endure incarceration and find methods of 
dealing with the process of imprisonment.163 Therefore, while in English-speaking 
countries ‘doing time’ refers to completing something similar to that of a (feasible) task 
in a predetermined amount of time, the phrase ‘discharging a sentence’ clearly shows the 
deep structural problems that are attributed to prisons in Venezuela. 
The problem with the penitentiary system is so extensive and perhaps so endemic 
to the Venezuelan penitentiary structure that it is ingrained in the culture and society, and 
reflected in the language. Furthermore, imprisonment is something to undergo, suffer, and 
tolerate as a result of the prison conditions; time does not become a driving factor in the 
prisoner’s demands because of the many inefficiencies of the sentencing system in 
Venezuela. Instead prisoners demand for mechanisms to better deal with incarceration. 
For instance, Birkbeck and Pérez-Santiago found that between October 2003 and 
September 2004, out of 47 protests in Venezuelan prisons only nine highlighted the issue 
of procedural delays while the rest focused on the betterment of prison life.164 
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Interestingly, the Chávez administration, through its Penitentiary Humanization 
Program, is also trying to change the narrative with which individuals refer to the 
penitentiary system and its elements. For instance, in articles 184 and 272 of the 
Bolivarian Constitution of Venezuela, prisoners were referred to as internos, or inmates, 
and prisons as penitentiary establishments.165 Cerrada Méndez in her 2010 speech at the 
Federal Legislative Palace mentioned that penitentiary functionaries now talk about 
custodial care and the penitentiary service and not about prisons or rehabilitation. In 
addition, the Chávez administration emphasizes that the prisoner is also a human being 
who happened to make a mistake during his/her lifetime.166 The latter change in the way 
prisoners are perceived has also influenced the way in which they are described, less as 
an individual defined by the penitentiary institution, which automatically draws a 
connection to criminality (a word with vast negative connotations), and instead as an 
individual deprived of freedom, una persona privada de libertad.167 Evidently, Chávez 
does not promote a classic rational model. Instead, the Humanization Program takes the 
form of a rehabilitation model but without the system’s condescending nature. In 
Chávez’s humanist approach individuals do not need to be fixed, but rather they need to 
realize their own potential. 
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Prison Conditions in Venezuela 
Prior to 1999 
In fact, a HRW report from 1997 entitled “Punishment Before Trial: Prison 
Conditions in Venezuela” established that Venezuela’s penitentiary crisis began in the late 
1980s and early 1990s as a consequence to the government response to Venezuelans’ 
demands on dealing with the drastic crime wave of this time.168 As a result of the soaring 
crime rates, Venezuelans felt compelled that the government take on a more active policy 
to control the situation. For this reason, imprisonment became an appealing (and simple) 
solution to the crime problem.169 Furthermore, the report established that by the mid-
1990s overcrowding, detention of unsentenced individuals, violence, lack of provision of 
services, and a deficient and degenerate infrastructure were among the most significant 
problems in Venezuelan prisons at the time; issues that persist today.170 
During the Bolivarian Revolution: 
The focus of this chapter is Chávez’s second administration because it was not 
until his second term that we start seeing efforts towards tackling the penitentiary crisis. It 
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was not until 2005 that the first evaluation of the penitentiary system was made. The 
Penitentiary Humanization Program is a result of this evaluation and it is the first major 
program meant to structurally change the penitentiary system. 
In 2006 Venezuela’s prison population equaled 19,700 of which 40 percent had 
been convicted, 57 percent were undergoing trial, and six percent were sentenced for 
work release, according to a Venezuelan NGO, OVP report.171 By 2009, the national 
prison population increased to 32,624 individuals of whom approximately 29 percent had 
been convicted, 67 percent was undergoing trial, and 4 percent were sentenced to work 
release.172 More recently, according to an AI report from March 2011, there are over 
40,000 prisoners in Venezuela.173 
One of the major problems found in Venezuelan prisons is overcrowding. A 
March 2011 AI report describes the Venezuelan prison system as being fit for 12,500 
inmates; it currently has three times the system’s capacity.174 To put this into perspective, 
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in El Rodeo I and II there are 3,500 prisoners in a penitentiary facility made for 750.175 
Apart from overcrowding, violence within prisons between inmates as well as between 
prisoners and the prison authorities is a major issue. The report mentions that more than 
1,600 inmates have died as a result of violence while another 3,100 were injured from 
2006 until 2009.176 During the first six months of 2010 alone, 221 inmates were killed 
and 449 were injured.177 Weapons are commonplace in Venezuelan prisons. In 2006, 
3,821 weapons were confiscated nationally, with spiked sticks and homemade firearms 
being the most prevalent, with a total of 2,712 and 802, respectively.178 However, the 
range of weapons is vast. For instance, in 2008 2,213 bladed weapons, 113 pistols, 107 
revolvers, 445 improvised firearms, 43 shotguns, two submachine guns, 60 grenades, and 
5,432 rounds of ammunition were confiscated.179 
A 2007 report from the OVP found that the following human rights of prisoners in 
Venezuela were violated: the right to human dignity; personal security; non-
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discrimination; freedom of expression, opinion and information; equality before the law, 
due process and judicial guarantees; education, culture and sports; work; and health. In 
reports produced by the OVP, from the years 2006, 2007, and 2009, common complaints 
about the penitentiary system included: Vast infrastructural problems in penitentiary 
institutions including the lack of sufficient establishments as well as the deteriorating 
conditions of prisons with problems ranging from sewage leaks and clogged sewers to a 
complete absence of potable water and deficient medical personnel and supplies. 
More specifically, according to the 2007 OVP report, the violation of the human 
dignity of Venezuelan prisoners involves the lack of sanitary facilities, potable water, and 
food security.180 In addition, inmates in Venezuelan penitentiaries are not classified or 
categorized by the functionaries, putting their personal security at high risk.181 The right 
to non-discrimination of Venezuelan prisoners is violated, particularly for female inmates 
and those individuals with HIV. Conjugal visits are made much more difficult for females 
and HIV infected prisoners are often times physically and socially isolated.182 The report 
found that although inmates did enjoy the opportunity to access information, it was 
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obtained through their families and not the state.183 Although educational, cultural and 
sports initiatives have been promoted by the government through the Bolivarian missions 
and other state agencies, they happen to take place on an irregular basis.184 The study 
found that inmates who work receive little to no remuneration; hence, their right to 
decent work is also being violated.185 The right to health has been violated on the basis 
that medical check-ups prior to entering the prisons are rarely performed and that there is 
a scarcity of medical personnel in penitentiary establishments.186 
Common complaints indirectly related to the penitentiary system and 
characteristic of the penal institutions included the persistence of illegal detentions and 
procedural delays. According to an OVP report from 2009, some individuals have 
awaited trial results for more than two years.187 Another constant concern is the lack of 
professionalism practiced by the Public Ministry as well as the judges, in part because of 
a deficiency in trained technicians in the area, which has also allowed for the police to 
take on leading roles in the decision-making process.188 
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According to the OVP 2009 report, between the years 2000-2008, the budget 
established for the penitentiary system was equivalent to no more than 0.82 percent of the 
national budget. The OVP argued in its report that even though the administration has 
promulgated reforms, the investments to carryout the projects have been highly 
insufficient, making it easy to question the government’s disposition to actually change 
the decadent prison system.189 To put into perspective the inadequate supply of funds in 
the penitentiary system while in the United States USD 34 are spent per inmate in 
Venezuela each inmate receives an average of USD 2.190 
The same OVP report outlines the policies and plans of the Ministry of the 
Interior and Justice from 1999 through 2010. Interestingly, there has been a policy/plan 
established for each year except for the years 2003 and 2005, all of which focused on 
tackling the aforementioned issues.191 However, prior to 2006, none of the policies/plans 
were established based on a diagnostic of the penitentiary system. Chávez’s Penitentiary 
Humanization Program opened up a new chapter in the way with which penitentiary 
issues are handled. 
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The Chávez Administration’s Penitentiary Humanization Program 
Although Chávez’s Penitentiary Humanization Program was not established until 
2006, his government did implement some reforms prior to his second term. According to 
the OVP, Chávez’s 1999 amended Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
was the first constitution to directly acknowledge the penitentiary system.192 Articles 184 
and 272 of the new constitution mention areas of reform. For instance, Article 184 
describes the importance and expected participation of the free community in the prisons 
in cultural, educational, and work-related activities, especially since the government 
expected to create new mechanisms that would allow states and municipalities to 
decentralize their control over the penitentiary system.193  
Complementing Article 184, Article 272 of the Bolivarian Constitution of 
Venezuela, mentions the state guarantee that the rehabilitation of inmates as well as the 
respect of their human rights would become a priority and that this would be achieved by 
introducing spaces for work, education, sports, and recreation in penitentiary 
establishments as well as by ensuring that these institutions would function under 
qualified professionals. In addition, the administration of the penitentiary establishments 
would be decentralized from the federal government and could even undergo some forms 
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of privatization. As a means to facilitate the reinsertion of former inmates into society and 
reduce recidivism, the government would create post-penitentiary institutions. Finally, the 
reformed constitution also established that imprisonment would be considered as the last 
alternative when dealing with criminal cases.194  
In 2005, the Chávez government carried out a study of the problems in the 
Venezuelan prisons and, as a result, the Penitentiary Humanization Program was created 
in 2006.195 The study looked at approximately 90 percent of all penitentiary 
establishments in the nation, a revision, according to Cerrada Méndez, that had never 
been done prior to the Chávez administration.196 According to a fact sheet produced by 
the Venezuelan Embassy to the United Kingdom and Ireland, the program’s focus is to 
promote ‘ethical, moral and social values’ while also fostering ‘social integration.’197 The 
Humanization Program involves all of Venezuela’s prisons and is designed to reduce 
violence, improve health conditions, and encourage the social reintegration of inmates.198 
The plan’s main objectives as outlined by Cerrada Méndez include the creation of a new 
institutional structure that is efficient, a fitting infrastructure that meets the needs of the 
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prisoners, and a system of comprehensive attention that will allow for the personal 
development of the prisoners.199 
During a press conference on March 16, 2010, Cerrada Méndez highlighted that 
among the most progressive changes of the penitentiary system under the Chávez 
administration is the promotion, enforcement, and protection of human rights. One of the 
explicit expressions of the human rights agenda in the Penitentiary Humanization 
Program can best be seen in the appointment of human rights delegates in some police 
stations and in all prisons nationwide.200 In addition, Human Rights Defense Councils 
have been created within prisons. These councils work to organize and represent the 
inmates of different prison blocks and function as mechanisms that allow for a direct 
dialogue between inmates and the authorities of the prisons.201 
Another institutional change led by the Penitentiary Humanization Project is that 
of creating a new institutional structure which will focus on strengthening institutional 
ethics.202 In part, this requires the creation of a new organizational culture. For instance, 
the Humanization Project seeks to provide direct attention to inmates from what Cerrada 
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Méndez describes will be a strictly hardworking and knowledgeable personnel that is 
truly committed to the betterment of the prisoners as individuals and their living 
conditions while in custody.203 Great emphasis is placed on the professionalization of the 
penitentiary service and the project seeks to bring in criminologists, sociologists, 
psychologists, social workers, and lawyers into the system.204 
As a means to improve the system’s efficiency, Prison Commissions have been 
created to take on case reviews and reduce procedural delays and an itinerant judges 
program has also been introduced as a means to ensure effective judicial supervision 
during the trial phases of cases against individuals who are detained while facing trial.205 
The decentralization of the penitentiary system from the control of the Ministry of the 
Interior and Justice is an important component of the Humanization Project, hence, 
mechanisms like the National Correctional Services Address have been created (although 
this institution was recently dissolved in August of 2011 and has been replaced by a new 
ministry on penitentiary services).206 Another institutional change involves the creation of 
a well-integrated Superior Penitentiary Congress consisting of the Supreme Tribunal of 
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Justice, the Public Ministry, the Ombudsman’s Office, and the different ministries 
including Education, Culture, Sports, Social Protection, Interior Relations and Justice, 
and the Bolivarian National Guard as an effort to gain different perspectives on 
penitentiary issues and, therefore, provide a comprehensive response; another crucial 
factor in the Penitentiary Humanization Program.207 
According to Cerrada Méndez, in regards to infrastructure, the Penitentiary 
Humanization Program will focus on the consolidation of the penitentiary establishments 
as well as the construction of new facilities.208 For instance, the program has created 
Penitentiary Communities, which provide the infrastructure that will allow for the 
comprehensive attention that seeks to be established nationwide.209 The creation of 
Penitentiary Communities exemplifies a philosophical change in regards to penitentiary 
establishments in which now the importance of family and integration is upheld.210 The 
first of these communities built was La Comunidad Penitenciaria de Coro in the state of 
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Falcon in 2008.211 As of 2008, another five penitentiary communities were in progress of 
being constructed as well, while 106 renovations nationwide were taking place.212 
Another aspect of the Humanization Program that seeks to both increase 
efficiency and security involves a technological upgrade. The installation of the Sistema 
Informático de Gestión Penitenciaria (Informational System for Penitentiary 
Management, SIGEP), allows the registration of inmates into the system which in turn 
facilitates accessing records and following up on the inmates’ progress.213 The Sistema 
Electrónico de Control de Acceso (Electronic System for Access Control, SECA) has also 
been recently introduced in the penitentiaries as a means to make the prisons safer in a 
noninvasive manner and with the aim of respecting the fundamental rights of all 
individuals.214 The SECA consists of metal detectors, metal detector bars, and a 
computer/scanner system as well as lockers to put away those objects that are 
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confiscated.215 According to Cerrada Méndez, as of March 2010, both of these systems of 
control have been put in place in 14 centers of the 33 total nationally.216 
The Humanization Program seeks to provide prisoners with comprehensive 
attention by ensuring that they have access to assistance in the areas of health, nutrition, 
education, recreation, as well as in job training and skill acquisition.217 In June 2010, the 
Venezuelan Ministry for the Interior and Justice signed an accord with the National 
Experimental Polytechnic University of the Armed Forces (UNEFA) to provide 
vocational training to the nation’s prisoners while also training prison personnel in human 
rights.218 In addition, the provision of individualized attention to the prisoner is another 
fundamental component of the Humanization Project and it would allow the classification 
and determination of the inmate’s particular policy of comprehensive attention during 
their time in custody.219 The project also seeks to establish custodial care by this year, an 
initiative that would designate a professional to take care of a particular inmate.220 
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Furthermore, Venezuela, according to Cerrada Méndez, is the only country in the 
world to have created a Penitentiary Symphony Orchestra network.221 Established in 
2007 as an initiative to help reduce violence in the prisons and assist in preparing inmates 
to reinter their societies after the completion of their sentences, the Penitentiary 
Symphony Orchestra network, as of August 2011, has been introduced in a total of seven 
prisons and there are plans of expanding it into three more prisons by the end of this 
year.222 In order to join the orchestra, prisoners must demonstrate a record of good 
behavior. Students are expected to attend lessons eight hours a day for five days a week 
and music instructors insist on hygiene and a neat appearance.223 The orchestra network 
is funded by the Inter-American Development Bank and is carried out by the State 
Foundation for the National System of Youth and Children’s Orchestras of Venezuela, the 
system which the Penitentiary Symphony Orchestra is based on.224 According to Cerrada 
Méndez, this orchestra has already had 3 concerts in Venezuela as of 2010.225 In addition 
to the innovative Penitentiary Symphony Orchestra, the Humanization Program has also 
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implemented annual championships in different sports such as basketball, softball, and 
soccer.226 
More recently, on June 14, 2011, Chávez, through decree number 8,266, created 
the Ministry for Penitentiary Services.227 The decree established that the responsibilities 
of the Correctional Services National Address will be transferred to the Ministry for 
Penitentiary Services (Article 6) and, as a result, the former institution will be eliminated 
(Article 10). According to this decree, the responsibilities of this new ministry include: 
The design and evaluation of policies, strategies, plans, and programs that exercise the 
fundamental rights of inmates and that focus on their security and helping them increase 
their possibilities of reinserting society by developing their potential and capabilities; the 
regulation of the organizational structure and functioning of the penitentiary system so 
that it strictly follows what is established in the constitution; the guarantee of an efficient 
penitentiary system serviced by professionals in the subject; to promote the construction, 
adaptation, and maintenance of penitentiary establishments; to design policies that 
guarantee comprehensive attention in the areas of education, health, culture, sports, work, 
and nutrition; to pursue the participation of families, and communal congresses.228 
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Clearly, Chávez has taken a humanist approach to tackle the prison crisis in 
Venezuela. In order to understand why the Chávez administration has chosen such an 
approach to try to solve the penitentiary crisis, it is important to consider the cultural 
perspective with which the issue is viewed. The following section will explain the 
philosophical foundations with which modern penitentiary systems emerged, 
Venezuelans’ perceptions of the penitentiary reality in their country, as well as an analysis 
of where Chávez’s Humanization Program falls. 
Why the Penitentiary Humanization Program is a First Step, but Not the Solution 
Although the Chávez government has made the renovation, remodeling, and 
construction of new penitentiary establishments a priority, with the drastic increase of 
prisoners in Venezuela, this solution is simply not going to solve the root of the problem. 
From 2006 to March of 2011, Venezuela’s prison population doubled, reaching 40,000 for 
a system that is meant to hold about 12,000 inmates. Overcrowding has become the 
principal issue in Venezuela’s penitentiary system which has led to an increase in 
violence within prisons and caused further damage to the old already, desintegrating, 
penitentiary establishments. As a result of rampant violence within prisons, human rights 
like the right to dignity and personal security are continuously violated. The lack of 
decent penitentiary infrastructure also endangers the possibility of inmates fully realizing 
their human right to dignity, personal security, education, culture, and sports, and health. 
If these are still usual problems five years after the introduction of the 
Penitentiary Humanization Program, one can only wonder how long it will take to begin 
to see a more positive picture of Venezuelan prisons. There is no doubt that the 
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Humanization Program itself is revolutionary and that its potential to change the lives of 
Venezuela’s imprisoned population is quite vast. However, there seems to be a disconnect 
between theory and practice. For instance, the OVP estimates of the budget attributed to 
the penitentiary system (0.82 percent of the national budget from the years 2000 to 2008) 
clearly show that it is highly underfunded. Although more recent data on the penitentiary 
system budget is not provided, the Humanization Program had already been promulgated 
for two years within the time of this study. With such idealistic goals as those set forth by 
the Penitentiary Humanization Project, one would think that expenditures would be 
greater than an equivalent of USD 2 per inmate. Custodial care as an initiative and the 
professionalization of the penitentiary service alone are highly expensive projects. To add 
to these goals, the investment in penitentiary infrastructure is also profoundly costly. It is 
crucial then that the Chávez government make increasing the prison system’s budget a 
priority. 
It may be too soon to fully evaluate Chávez’s Penitentiary Humanization Program 
and perhaps the real problem lies in Venezuela’s larger criminal justice system. The 
reform undertaken within prison walls can only do so much, true change can only be 
achieved within the actual institutions that make, enforce, and practice the law. 
In sum, the Penitentiary Humanization Program is the earliest and perhaps most 
ambitious project aimed at tackling the penitentiary crisis during the Chávez 
administration. This program seeks to completely shift the system from that of a punitive 
one to a rehabilitation-focused system, and in turn, predominantly aims at humanizing 
prison facilities. Although the program has the potential of changing the living conditions 
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of individuals deprived of their liberty in a significantly positive way, and although the 
system also emphasizes reforms outside prison walls, commitment to the program is still 
questionable. Furthermore, the penitentiary crisis in Venezuela requires more than just a 
reform in the penitentiary system, but also in the criminal justice system at large. 
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Chapter 5: Elaboration of the Statement of the Problem 
Statement of the Problem 
This thesis argues that even though preventive detention is allowed for a 
maximum of two years under the Venezuelan Organic Code of Criminal Procedure, the 
system works in such a way that deprives many Venezuelans of their liberty, keeps those 
under preventive detention past the allotted legal time, and does so in appalling 
conditions violating human dignity. The (mis)use of preventive detention exacerbates the 
overcrowding in prisons. This, in turn, further intensifies the precarious conditions of 
prison facilities in Venezuela which inherently (negatively) affect the already abysmal 
living conditions for individuals deprived of their liberty. 
Moreover, these circumstances arise out of a larger criminal justice system failure. 
As the research process progressed, it became evident that in addition to there not being 
much available information on the topic of preventive detention in Venezuela, whatever 
little information that was available came from sources with a distinct political tendency. 
This clear political tendency has translated into a highly politicized discussion on 
preventive detention and the criminal justice system failure in Venezuela. The lack of 
clear-cut available data on behalf of the Venezuelan state does not contribute in a positive 
manner to the discussion either. However, contrary to common belief, this thesis seeks to 
prove that the (mis)use of preventive detention is mostly accidental, that it is not 
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systematic in the sense that it is not targeting a particular group of people due to their 
political affiliation and/or beliefs. Nevertheless, there are certainly cases where it is 
undeniable that politics played a role, yet these cases are not the rule. Instead, I argue that 
it is the political discourse on both sides which has allowed the depiction of the (mis)use 
of preventive detention to be based on political (really politicized) terms. In the midst of 
this highly politicized debate, I want to highlight what is (and should be) of utmost 
importance, the human rights violations experienced by detained Venezuelans in general. 
Justification 
It is argued that the current criminal justice system in Venezuela has its origins as 
a consequence of the rising crime and violence that began in the 1980s, which led to 
widespread feelings of discontent with the state and its penal mechanisms. In fact, due to 
this significant change in Venezuelan society, imprisonment began to be perceived as a 
logical solution to crime and violence. Nevertheless, the perceived (and existing) 
inefficiencies of the system at the time pushed the state to take on UN recommendations 
and shift the legal system from that of an inquisitive to an adversarial system. It was 
hoped that the reformed penal code of 1998 would make justice fast and prisons solely 
for convicted individuals, placing freedom as a priority. 
Accordingly, Chávez, after taking power in 1999, took the responsibility to 
uphold these new changes that were meant to espouse international human rights 
guidelines. Authors like Alguíndigue and Pérez Perdomo (2008) as well as Ungar (2003) 
suggest that the penal reform of 1998 did not propagate the required shift of the legal 
system from that of an inquisitive to that of an adversarial system, which was at the core 
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of the reform. In practice, this has translated into the interpretation of the new reformed 
adversarial penal code along inquisitive lines, meaning that there is still a disregard for 
freedom in exchange for achieving penal efficiency. Consequently, the Chávez 
administration has failed to uphold international human rights guidelines regarding 
preventive detention. 
The most prominent argument explaining this failure is that of a new legal 
culture under Chávez. According to Pérez Perdomo (2009), there is currently a 
political character to law, suggesting that the judicial system is expected to serve 
the interests of the Bolivarian Revolution, when clearly there should not be.229 
Moreover, as Ungar (2003) argues, administratively reformed laws and policies 
need a higher level of institutional accountability and cooperation, factors which 
seem to not be currently available in most of Latin America, with Venezuela being 
no exception. In other words, Pérez Perdomo (2009) and Ungar (2003) suggest 
that there is a lessening of judicial independence and as a result, a weakening of 
the rule of law. 
Julia Buxton’s (2005) analysis of the political crisis in Venezuela under Chávez 
helps place the legal culture argument into a politico-historical context. Buxton finds that 
Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution has demarcated a clear separation from the past, but, 
                                                 
 
 
 
229
 Rogelio Pérez Perdomo, Derecho y Cultura Jurídica en Venezuela en Tiempos de Revolución 
(1999-2009, (2009): 465. 
91 
nevertheless, has made the same mistake of exclusion, in this case those outside of the 
bounds of the officialist band.230 Although Buxton’s focus is the current political crisis in 
Venezuela, this stark separation in politics may also help explain the supposed waning of 
judicial independence and the rule of law in Venezuela. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that there is no existing scholarly work on pre-
trial preventive detention specific to Venezuela. Most of the scholarly work on the topic 
was very general and did not provide a detailed analysis of the issue, particularly since 
the majority of the work on the criminal justice system and its components has been 
focused on the penitentiary crisis at large, with preventive detention being just a small 
component of the chaos in the prisons and other penal institutions. Although it is 
consistently highlighted throughout this literature that there are less visible structural 
problems within the instruments and institutions of criminal justice which feed into the 
penitentiary crisis in Venezuela, these less visible structural problems have also not been 
the focus of study. In summary, very little has been written on the issue of preventive 
detention in Venezuela. Moreover, the scholarly emphasis has been very general, in turn, 
providing a very general understanding of the penitentiary crisis and its causes. 
There has been a proliferation of discourse on the issue of preventive detention in 
Venezuela due to the work of national local community organizations as well as that of 
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IGOs and NGOs and the means of mass communications. This public discussion of pre-
trial preventive detention is equally as politicized as any other conversation involving the 
Chávez administration; fact which is quite problematic due to the limited amount of 
information on the topic. In addition, information on preventive detention is not readily 
available on behalf of the state, putting the government at a disadvantage, as well as at 
fault, in the direction the nature of these discussions have taken. In fact, Alguíndigue and 
Pérez Perdomo (2008) argue that there is a gap in the literature, especially since the 
government never followed-up on the legislative and structural changes made throughout 
the Chávez administration. Therefore, these authors argue it is a very difficult task to 
determine whether reforms during the Chávez administration have improved the penal 
situation in Venezuela, particularly in the case of preventive detention.231 
This thesis presents the structural problems found in the Venezuelan criminal 
justice system, namely both the lack of sufficient staff and professionalism in the 
workforce. Specifically, the thesis focuses on the effects of preventive detention on 
overcrowding; and the effect of overcrowding on the human rights of those that are 
detained. Furthermore, when following both Venezuelan and United States news and 
media outlets, it becomes quite apparent that most of the work on preventive detention 
has an undermining, if not explicit, political agenda. This has led to a disconnect between 
more notorious cases of preventive detention and the rest, which I believe to be just 
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another, of the many, political strategies to defame human rights under the Chávez 
administration. 
In sum, the contribution of this thesis is that it shines a light on the politicization 
of the topic and provides a counter-hegemonic discourse on the issue, proving that the 
present hegemonic discourse on preventive detention in Venezuela consists of a 
generalization of highly politicized cases. All this takes away from the issue at hand, 
which is that of the grave violations of human rights of those preventively detained in 
Venezuela, regardless of their status as political prisoners or not. 
Why Challenge the Hegemonic Discourse on Preventive Detention in Venezuela? 
This section seeks to highlight the politicization of the discourse on preventive 
detention in Venezuela. The Venezuelan state has, in recent years, been featured in the 
media for its supposed systematic attacks on human rights, particularly the rights of 
activists, reporters, and any others depicted as threats to the Bolivarian government’s 
interests. Surprisingly, local legal experts, as reported by Simon Romero in The New York 
Times article “Criticism of Chávez Stifled by Arrests” in April of 2010, claim that 
“political prisoners” are relatively few, amounting to no more than 30 Venezuelans total 
in 2010, including Afiuni herself.232 This relatively small number of individuals 
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considered political prisoners, in fact shows that preventive arrests and detentions may 
not be as systematic as the overall media suggests. 
I am not suggesting that political prisoners are a necessary evil nor am I 
condoning the existence of political prisoners, but rather, I want to emphasize that 
although Chávez has been consistently portrayed in the media as a dictator, strongman, 
despot, autocrat, caudillo, among many other nouns referring to authoritarian and 
militaristic leadership, this number of political prisoners is most definitely small. As a 
result, this sole piece of evidence creates a challenge for the argument that claims Chávez 
to have been an authoritarian ruler. In addition, it is important to keep in mind that there 
is a significant difference between an authoritarian ruler and a government with 
authoritarian tendencies. 
Consequently, there is a dominant discourse that continues to promote the 
political polarization of Venezuelan society, depicting those detained as enemies of the 
Bolivarian Revolution currently taking shape in Venezuela. The politicization of the issue 
of preventive detention seems to be just another strategy aimed at tarnishing not just the 
human rights record of the Chávez administration, but also delegitimizing the Bolivarian 
administration in general. This hegemonic discourse supersedes and disregards any of the 
accomplishments, even in human rights, that the Bolivarian government has achieved. 
Therefore, although vast human rights violations have undoubtedly taken place during 
this administration, I want to bring to the fore that the issue of preventive detention has 
not escaped politicization. In turn, this issue has been viewed through a particular lens, 
blurring reality and generalizing exceptionally politicized cases of preventive detention. 
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The private Venezuelan local media as well as Western liberal outlets must be 
specially recognized for its accomplishments in highlighting particularly important 
political cases of the (mis)use of preventive detention, further politicizing them and 
transforming them into larger generalizations of the reality of preventive detention in 
Venezuela. This, in turn, shifts the emphasis of the discussion to politics rather than on 
the vast human rights violations experienced by detainees regardless of their status and 
background (and media attention received). 
The purpose of this thesis is not to overlook the faults and failures of the Chávez 
administration, but instead to propose a shift in the politicized discussion. Rather than 
following the hegemonic discussion which depicts Chávez and his Bolivarian Revolution 
as a prominent (negative) break in Venezuelan political and democratic history, I propose 
a new lens. This new lens, which is equally critical, perceives the Bolivarian Revolution 
to be an attempted break from the past. It is an attempted break from the past because 
although the law has changed significantly in Venezuela since 1999, the practice of the 
law has not. In turn, the disconnect between law and reality have led to a continuation, 
perhaps in a more explicit form, of the politics of the past. 
Nevertheless the politicization of the issue of preventive detention in Venezuela 
should not shift the main focus of this thesis which is that, individuals deprived of their 
liberty in Venezuela, specifically those under preventive detention, whether political 
prisoners or not, experience a vast number of violations to their human rights. 
The case of Judge Afiuni exemplifies both, the exceptional cases as well as the 
problems experienced by detainees whose arrest was not highly politicized/personalized. 
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The goal of this section is to show how Afiuni’s case although exceptional in some ways, 
is also not deviant from most of the other cases of preventive detention. Afiuni’s case 
shows an undoubtedly powerful influence of the President in judicial decisions and the 
vast human rights violations detained persons experience regardless of the protections set 
forth in the Bolivarian constitution, in addition to a politicized discourse. 
The Afiuni Case 
Afiuni was the 31st Control Judge for the Metropolitan Area of Caracas.233 On 
December 10, 2009, Afiuni carried out a preliminary hearing for Eligio Cedeño, 
individual detained for accusations of subverting currency controls and whom had 
already been deprived of his liberty for more than two years, the maximum term of 
preventive detention as provided in the Venezuelan Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 
230.234 Since September 1, 2009 Cedeño’s detention had been declared arbitrary by the 
UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, which cited violations to a fair trial on behalf 
of the Venezuelan state. Afiuni decided to follow UN recommendations to replace the 
current custodial measure against Cedeño (since it had surpassed the two year maximum 
permitted by the Venezuelan Code of Criminal Procedure) with a non-custodial path to 
trial which also prohibited Cedeño from leaving the country, and demanded the retention 
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of his passport and that he present himself before the court every 15 days.235 However, it 
is important to note that Cedeño quickly fled the country after his release, an important 
detail often left out by the opposition media.236  
It is reported that hours after former Judge Afiuni’s decision on Cedeño, the 
Venezuelan intelligence agency (then DISIP, now SEBIN) raided the headquarters of the 
31st control court, taking Afiuni as well as two sheriffs into custody.237  
On December 11, 2009 Chávez’s response to Afiuni’s decision was broadcasted 
nationwide on both television and radio, where he called Afiuni a “bandit” and personally 
requested the maximum penalty of 30 years imprisonment to the Attorney General and 
the Supreme Court of Justice, a measure in order to preserve the dignity of the country.238 
Chávez even exclaimed that:239  
… A new law needs to be established because a judge that frees a bandit is 
much more severe than the bandit himself. It is infinitely severe for a Republic, 
for a country, that a murderer be released by a judge for pay. This is more severe 
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than a murder, as a result, she and others who do the same must be sentenced 
with the highest punishment… 
The president also mentioned that Afiuni’s action would have put her before a firing 
squad in earlier times, due to his belief that she had accepted a bribe from Cedeño.240  
On December 12, 2009, information from the Prosecutor General stated that 
Judge Afiuni was imputed on that same day by the Public Ministry for alleged crimes, 
including: Corruption, abuse of authority, and favoring evasion and association to commit 
a crime.241 
Like the man Afiuni ordered for release, she has also been detained for more than 
the two year maximum allotted in the Venezuelan criminal code.242 Afiuni was initially 
placed in a women’s prison near Caracas, the National Institute of Feminine Orientation 
(INOF). It is unclear if Afiuni was put in a space near or actually in a cell with more than 
20 inmates whom she had sentenced on charges like murder and drug smuggling. 
Nevertheless, the proximity to inmates she had tried in either case put her personal 
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integrity in constant risk.243 According to a July 2011 report from the Andres Bello 
Catholic University (UCAB) Center for Human Rights, forensic studies of Afiuni noted a 
series of scars that had not been reported in the first medical evaluation realized on 
December 10, 2009, when she was first placed in state custody.244 Therefore, reports 
suggest that Afiuni experienced plenty of physical violence during her detention at INOF, 
including more recent, yet not confirmed, allegations that she was also raped while in 
prison and consequently had an abortion.245  
In addition to the physical violence Afiuni experienced at INOF, she was also 
deprived some of the most basic rights, including the lack of exposure to sun light for 
approximately 10 months. It is reported that the few times she was allowed outside of her 
cell occurred only at night time and still within prison hallways and facilities.246 The one 
time Afiuni was exposed to the sun, she was forced to sit under the sunlight for 20 
minutes straight, which resulted in Afiuni feeling nauseous and weak to the point of 
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fainting (the sudden exposure to sun was a drastic change for a human being who had 
been kept encaged). The UCAB report claims that due to Afiuni’s reaction to her first 
encounter with the outdoors and sunlight in months, from that day onwards she was no 
longer permitted outside of her cell.247 
Apart from the inevitable health concerns Afiuni acquired from living in such 
conditions at INOF, her health began to take a turn for the worse when a lump was found 
beneath one of her underarms in March of 2010. By November 2010, Afiuni’s condition 
worsened, presenting hemorrhages which were a product of uterine problems. Afiuni’s 
defense consistently asked for permission to seek medical assistance for the defendant, 
attempts which according to the UCAB were left unheard. In December 10, 2010, the 
president of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights even ordered provisional 
measures necessary for Afiuni to be assisted by doctors of her choice.248 The resolution 
also required that the State adopt measures that would allow Afiuni to remain in a place 
adequate to her circumstances, paying close attention to her former position as a penal 
judge.249  
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On January 27, 2011, at the Oncological Hospital of Caracas, Afiuni was told that 
she required a total hysterectomy, which was performed on February 3, 2011 by the 
doctor of her choice. Due to Afiuni’s condition, the court agreed on February 2, 2011 that 
she would undergo house arrest after she was released from the hospital. Afiuni was 
released on February 8, 2011 and has been in house arrest ever since.250 The UCAB 
report highlights that contrary to common belief, house arrest has not actually improved 
Afiuni’s living conditions, for she is still unable to engage in outdoor activities, also 
further inhibiting access to sunlight, a basic right.251 As a result, on June 22, 2011 
Afiuni’s lawyers presented to the judge, that in accordance with rules 11 and 21.1 of the 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, Afiuni was allowed and 
consequently would use the common areas of the building where she is under house 
arrest for the purpose of being exposed to natural light and take part in open air exercise. 
However, on June 30, 2011 the judge responded that the court denied the request 
providing no justification.252  
The UCAB report stated that although Afiuni was granted access to the hospital 
for her surgery, the follow-up exams needed after Afiuni’s surgery to ensure a complete 
recovery, had not been completed. In fact, Afiuni’s defense denounced that this was due 
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to blackmailing and attempted extorting on behalf of the judge responsible for Afiuni’s 
case, who threatened to send Afiuni back to INOF if she did not accept to go to court, 
matter which Afiuni has consistently refused to do because of the lack of judicial 
guarantees provided to her. The judge also promised that Afiuni would be allowed to visit 
the doctor of her choice if she followed through with the judge’s petition. Afiuni’s 
defense argues that it is for this reason that on April 28, 2011 the judge unilaterally and 
with no consultation changed the date of Afiuni’s transportation for a medical 
appointment, inherently forcing her to miss it.253  
The report mentions countless instances where Afiuni’s medical appointments 
were completely disregarded and the consequences of this on Afiuni’s health. In mid-July 
of 2011, Afiuni’s defense presented a written request asking for measures that would 
allow more flexibility for the realization of Afiuni’s pending medical exams. But on July 
25, 2011 the judge denied the request, claiming that the defense had not presented 
documents that supported the request. The UCAB report highlights a contradiction in the 
judge’s decision, mainly due to the fact that the defense does not have access to Afiuni’s 
health reports in the first place.254 This is so because it has been established by judicial 
order that Afiuni’s clinical/medical history remain safeguarded in the hospital without 
any legal justification. Furthermore, a copy of the medical history is not available on the 
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judicial record. The UN Commission on Human Rights has classified the denial of 
medical history records as a form of cruel and inhuman treatment.255 
More recently, on June 7, 2013, the national prosecutor’s office requested to 
release Afiuni due to her necessary medical treatments. On June 14, Afiuni was granted 
conditional release by the 17th Court Judge, Marilda Ríos. The terms of the conditional 
release granted to Afiuni require her to report to authorities every 15 days, she is not 
allowed to leave the country, and is still prohibited from engaging with the media.256 
Although the conditional release granted to Afiuni undoubtedly enhances her 
human rights, her prior experiences were constant threats to her most basic rights. The 
human rights violations experienced by Afiuni are those predominantly related to 
principles concerning the physical, psychological, and moral integrity of the individual 
and range from abuses discussed in instruments like: The Standard Minimum Rules for 
the Treatment of Prisoners; the ICCPR; and the Body of Principles for the Protection of 
All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment; the Code of Conduct for Law 
Enforcement Officials; The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; The 
American Convention on Human Rights; Inter-American Convention to Prevent and 
Punish Torture; the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; the Venezuelan 
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Organic Code of Criminal Procedure; and the Regulations for Judicial Internment 
Centers. 
The inherent right to life is guarded by law to ensure that no human being is 
arbitrarily deprived of their life. This is established in the articles 6.1, 4, 43 of the ICCPR, 
the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Bolivarian Constitution respectively. 
There are also several provisions in law to guard every individual’s right to humane 
treatment. Article XXV, Article 2, Article 5, Article 10.1, Article 272, and Principle 1 of 
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the Code of Conduct for Law 
Enforcement Officials, the American Convention on Human Rights, the ICCPR, the 
Bolivarian Constitution, and the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons state 
that under any form of detention or imprisonment the individual has the right to humane 
treatment due to the inherent human dignity of persons. Most detainees are unable to 
exercise this right and are often subjected to mental torture and physical suffering during 
their investigation or detention period. This trend is coherent with what is observed in the 
case of Judge Afiuni who was put in a cell with/close to more than 20 inmates who she 
had herself sentenced on charges such as drug smuggling and murder. She was raped in 
prison and it is claimed that INOF Governor Isabel Gonzalez abused her in the form of 
insults to her personal dignity, in addition to physical and moral forms of abuse. This 
explains how inhumane and unprotected the environment can be for the detainee. 
Much along the same lines fall some other human rights instruments like the 
ICCPR (Article 7), the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any 
Form of Detention or Imprisonment (Principle 6), the Code of Conduct for Law 
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Enforcement Officials (Article 5),  the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 
5), Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (Article 2), and the 
Bolivarian Constitution (Article 46), which state that no one, regardless of the 
circumstances shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. 
The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture defines torture as 
any act intentionally performed whereby physical or mental pain or suffering is inflicted 
on a person as personal punishment, as a preventive measure, as a penalty, or for any 
other purpose. Furthermore, torture shall also be understood to as any use of methods 
upon a person, which is intended to obliterate the personality of the victim or to diminish 
his physical or mental capacities, even if they do not cause physical pain or mental 
anguish. Furthermore, Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials defines torture as 
an intentionally inflicted form of pain or suffering that may be physiological or 
psychological, and that caused by or at the instigation of a public official in order to force 
information out of the detainee. This could also be aimed to not only procure information 
from the tortured individual but also to get him to confess or to intimidate or punish him 
for any act he is suspected of having committed/has committed. Torture, according to this 
definition excludes pain and suffering caused within the lawfully sanctioned limits well 
covered in the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. This right was 
also among others which could not be exercised in the case of Afiuni. In addition to other 
forms of violence including confinement and physical torture, she was forced to live 
without any exposure to sun light for approximately 10 months. Needless to say, such 
deprivation can cause irreparable psychological damage. 
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Article 9 of the ICCPR states that everyone has the right to liberty and security of 
person. This article heavily emphasizes that it shall not be the general rule that persons 
awaiting trial shall be detained in custody. Following the right to security, Article 5, 
Article 10.2, Principle 8 of the American Convention on Human rights, the ICCPR, The 
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment, respectively, establish that accused persons shall be segregated from 
convicted persons and shall be treated appropriately according to their status as 
unconvicted persons. In addition, Rule 8 of The Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners highlights the further categorization of individuals deprived of 
their liberty within and from institutions, taking into account their sex, age, and their 
criminal record. Once again Judge Afiuni’s case clearly reflects the lack of concern for 
the security of the detainee. It is easy to fathom the threat and constant fear for a woman 
who is confined in a cell with/close to 20 other inmates who she had herself sentenced on 
charges like murder or drug smuggling. 
Another contextually appropriate right for those under detention is their right to 
be presumed innocent until proven guilty. Article XXVI, Article 8, Article 14.2, Principle 
36, and Rule 84 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the 
American Convention on Human Rights, the ICCPR, the Body of Principles for the 
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, and the 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, respectively, states that 
everyone charged with a criminal offense shall have the right to be presumed innocent 
until proven guilty according to law. In the case of Judge Afiuni, the very day after her 
arrest, a television broadcast publicly presented then President Chávez’s statement 
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declaring Afiuni a “bandit”. Also, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was asked to 
hold Afiuni “in prison” and to penalize with “maximum penalty for her: 30 years in 
prison.” Such public declarations are a downright violation of the right to presume as 
innocent till proven guilty. 
Equally important as other rights mentioned below would be one to ensure proper, 
timely and free medical assistance to these individuals under consideration. Rule 24, 
Principle 24, Article 83 of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 
the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment, the Bolivarian Constitution states that medical care and treatment shall be 
provided whenever necessary during detention and shall always be provided free of 
charge. Furthermore, Article 6 of the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials 
states that law enforcement officials shall ensure the full protection of the health of 
persons in their custody. In the case of Afiuni, as a result of her harsh living conditions at 
INOF, it was found that she had developed a lump beneath one of her underarms. Her 
condition worsened, presenting hemorrhages which were a product of uterine problems. 
Afiuni’s defense consistently asked for permission to seek medical assistance for the 
defendant which according to reports seems like these attempts were left unheard. 
There are several legal provisions meant to protect and empower detained 
individuals with a right to due process. Articles XXV, XXVI, and XVIII of the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Article 8 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights, and Principles 36 and 38 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of 
All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, and the Venezuelan Organic 
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Code of Criminal Procedure establish that in cases where individuals have been deprived 
of their liberty, they have the right to a public hearing and a fair trial, with due guarantees 
and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, 
previously established by law. All criminal proceedings shall be public, except insofar as 
may be necessary to protect the interests of justice. The presumption of Judge Afiuni’s 
being guilty, a public declaration of the same along with demand for maximum penalty of 
thirty years of imprisonment even before a fair trial, all of these are inherently very brutal 
violations of right to due process.  
The Politicization of the Afiuni Case 
According to the 2009 Inter-American Court of Human Rights Report on 
democracy and human rights in Venezuela, three rapporteurs from the UN expressed that 
the arrest and detention of Judge Afiuni was “a hit on behalf of President Hugo Chávez to 
the independence of judges and lawyers in the country.”257 They also highlighted that 
“the retaliation for exercising functions that are guaranteed in the constitution and the 
creation of an environment of fear within the judiciary and among lawyers does not serve 
any other purpose than that of undermining the rule of law and obstruct justice.”258  
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The same report expresses that along with Judge Afiuni, there are also other cases 
where judges have been dismissed, under similar conditions, almost immediately after 
having adopted judicial decisions in cases of supposed political importance. In addition, 
the report also highlights that due to almost the immediate arrests of these judges, it is 
hard to determine if they were detained with prior declarations of their wrongdoings. 
Moreover, the resolutions that establish the causes which motivate the dismissals are not 
clear and there is not even a reference to the procedure with which the decision was 
adopted. The report highlights how this is a strong signal to society as well as the rest of 
the judges that the judiciary does not have the freedom to adopt decisions contrary to 
government interests, since doing so may put them at risk of being removed from their 
positions.259  
In an interview with BBC Mundo, Roberto Garretón, member of the UN working 
group on Arbitrary Detention, stated that in order for Afiuni to be a political prisoner, she 
needed to have been imprisoned as a result of her ideas. Garretón mentioned that he was 
not sure that this was the case. However, according to BBC Mundo, Garretón believes 
that Afiuni’s case is emblematic of how an individual fulfilling their duty can be put in 
jail, asking “what will other judges in Venezuela think?”260  
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Even Noam Chomsky, an American Institute Professor and Professor Emeritus in 
the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy at MIT as well as a prominent public 
intellectual, and an ally of sorts to Chávez, had an opinion on Afiuni’s case. Chomsky 
communicated to the Venezuelan president his concern over the case of former judge 
Afiuni through public letters in two different instances, in July and December of 2011.  
Chomsky’s main concern in his letters to former President Chávez is Afiuni’s health, 
asking for “clemency on humanitarian grounds,” mainly due to Afiuni’s health. In 
addition, Chomsky perceives that Afiuni has undoubtedly been treated very badly and 
asks the Chávez administration to act on its humanitarian and Bolivarian values and free 
Afiuni. He also pointed out that Venezuela was not alone in facing a situation in which 
judges felt a sense of intimidation in carrying out their duties.261 
Chomsky’s open letters caused a stir in the international community. A July 2, 
2011 The New York Times article by journalist Simon Romero, is a perfect example of 
how language in the media continues to promote the hegemonic discourse, even when 
discussing issues like preventive detention in Venezuela. For instance, the article by 
Romero is titled “Noted Leftist Urges Chávez to Release Ailing Judge.” The title is 
highly subjective, already starting off the article with a wow factor, implying to readers 
that even those on the left are extremely critical of the Chávez administration; as if 
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criticism from within was something previously unheard of. Another interesting use of 
language on behalf of Romero in this article can be seen with the following statement: 
“Mr. Chomsky’s willingness to press for Judge Afiuni’s release shows how the 
president’s aggressive policies toward the judiciary have stirred unease among some who 
are generally sympathetic to Mr. Chávez’s socialist-inspired political movement.” The 
language in this sentence, as in the title, continues to suggest how terrible the Chávez 
administration must be that even one of its own is critical of it. 
Furthermore, another problematically expressed claim is that of describing 
Afiuni’s arrest as having been carried out by “the president’s secret intelligence police,” 
when, in fact, Afiuni was arrested by the Bolivarian Intelligence Service and is a security 
force subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior and Justice, and contrary to what is 
implied, is not the president’s private security force.262  
In a The Guardian article published by Virginia López and Tom Phillips on 
December 21, 2011 and titled “Noam Chomsky pleads with Hugo Chávez to free judge in 
open letter,” the authors mention that the news of December 13, 2011 that a judge in 
Venezuela extended Afiuni’s house arrest by two years prompted Chomsky’s latest open 
letter to demand humanitarian release for Afiuni. The article also mentions that Chomsky 
has been, nevertheless, very critical of the way in which the media has covered the case, 
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arguing that the Afiuni case has received the widespread attention it has only because of 
the Venezuelan government’s status as an “official enemy” of the United States. He also 
mentioned in the phone interview with The Guardian that he is constantly involved in 
many other similar appeals but that he receives no attention until it is a case like that of 
Afiuni’s, where an enemy of the United States is involved. He also added that this 
situation is more reflective of the media than on the actual case.263  
In a highly debated article by Rory Carroll from The Guardian titled “Noam 
Chomsky criticises old friend Hugo Chávez for 'assault' on democracy” and published on 
July 2, 2011, among Carroll’s non-controversial statements, the journalist highlights that 
even though Chomsky is critical of Afiuni’s continued detention, he remains fiercely 
critical of the United States as well, highlighting the case of Bradley Manning and the 
continued “vicious, unremitting” campaign against Venezuela.264  
Keane Bhatt’s blog “Manufacturing Contempt,” affiliated with the North 
American Congress on Latin America’s (NACLA) Media Accuracy on Latin America 
project, takes a critical look at the U.S. media and its portrayals of the hemisphere. On 
May 14, 2013 Bhatt reports on a petition signed by 23 experts on Latin America and the 
media, including Chomsky and himself, and was sent on that same day to Margaret 
Sullivan, Public Editor of The New York Times. Sullivan had written a column for the 
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opinion pages of The New York Times on April 12, 2013 titled “‘Targeted Killing,’ 
‘Detainee’ and ‘Torture’: Why Language Choice Matters” where she expressed:265 
Although individual words and phrases may not amount to very much in the great flow 
produced each day, language matters. When news organizations accept the government’s 
way of speaking, they seem to accept the government’s way of thinking. In The Times, 
these decisions carry even more weight. 
Referring to this column, the authors urged Sullivan to compare The New York Times’ 
characterization of Chávez’s leadership in Venezuela and that of Roberto Micheletti and 
Porfirio Lobo’s in Honduras. The petitioners expressed that there was a clear distinction, 
in fact a “disparity in coverage and language use,” in the way each leadership style is 
talked about; highly suggestive of the U.S. government’s positions regarding the 
Honduran government (which is perceived as an ally) and the Venezuelan government 
(which is perceived as an enemy). According to the petitioners, in the past four tears, The 
New York Times news coverage has referred to Chávez as an “autocrat,” “despot,” 
“authoritarian ruler” and a “caudillo” and when opinion pieces are included, The New 
York Times has published at least fifteen separate articles employing language that depicts 
Chávez as a “dictator” or “strongman.” Even though Chávez is a democratically elected 
leader; even despite the widespread disagreements on the democratic credentials of the 
Chávez administration, there are most definitely democratic elements. While since the 
June 28, 2009 military overthrow of elected resident Manuel Zelaya of Honduras, The 
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New York Times contributors have never used such terms to describe Micheletti, who 
headed the coup regime after Zelaya’s ousting, or Micheletti’s successor, Porfirio Lobo. 
The authors claim that instead, The New York Times has described these leaders in its 
news coverage as “interim,” “de facto,” and “new.”266  
Cases of Accidental Detention 
Data that outlined the total number of individuals under preventive detention in 
Venezuela in comparison to the rest of the penitentiary population was not available in 
online Venezuelan government sources like the Ministry of Penitentiary Services, the 
Attorney General, the judiciary, the Supreme Court, or the interior and justice ministry. 
However, annual reports from the Venezuelan Ombudsman’s office, a government agency 
directed at addressing citizen’s human rights grievances, do report citizen claims related 
to cases of preventive detention under the heading of violations to the right of liberty of 
person. The data from the Ombudsman’s office helps put into perspective how much of a 
prevalent issue preventive detention is according to the number of citizen claims. 
Although nevertheless helpful, the information from the Ombudsman’s office does not 
provide with a clear count of individuals under preventive detention.  
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On the other hand, OVP is one of the most prominent human rights organizations 
in Venezuela whose work solely focuses on the rights of Venezuelans deprived of their 
liberty. OVP’s annual reports provide insightful information regarding the penitentiary 
population and its composition. The OVP annual reports primarily divide the composition 
of the penitentiary population into two categories, that of prosecuted and convicted 
individuals. Although the OVP annual reports do not provide numbers on those under 
preventive detention, these reports still depict the slow speed of the judicial process; a 
factor also affecting those that are under preventive detention. Moreover, the data from 
OVP, as seen in Table 1, also makes evident the significant growth of the penitentiary 
population in recent years, with 2009 seeing almost a 66 percent increase of the 
penitentiary population since 2004, with the prosecuted population approximately 
doubling in numbers during this period of time. The sharp increase of the penitentiary 
population, mainly reflected in the high number of prosecuted but not convicted 
individuals, points at structural problems in the criminal justice system. 
Table 1: Breakdown of National Penal Population in Venezuela 
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On the other hand, the annual Obudsman’s office annual reports show the large 
influx of individuals that are detained but that do not reach prosecution. Table 2 outlines 
the number of claims received annually by the Ombudsman’s office. These annual reports 
demonstrate that the (mis)use of pre-trial preventive detention in Venezuela is a 
widespread practice. 
Table 2: Complaints to the National Ombudsman’s Office in Venezuela Regarding 
Violations to the Right to the Liberty of Person 
 
The Ombudman’s office annual reports cite that the right to the liberty of person 
is often violated in Venezuela. The right to the liberty of persons in international as well 
as regional human rights instruments is usually combined with that of the rights of life 
and security, usually termed “the right to life, security, and liberty of person.” The 
Ombudsman’s annual reports also showed that whenever the right to liberty of person 
was violated, it was mainly due to arbitrary arrests. The cases of pre-trial preventive 
detention outlined by the Ombudman’s office mainly involve arbitrary arrest and 
detention, cases in which the police and other national security/armed forces had 
exceeded their power and had detained individuals without a judicial order. 
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Arbitrary arrests, as noted in the Ombudsman’s reports, often came accompanied 
with other violations including the denial of any form of communication on behalf of the 
detained person with their family (isolation), the failure of the agents to identify 
themselves prior to taking part in the arrest, and in the most extreme cases, forced 
disappearances. Clearly, the violation of the right to liberty of person through arbitrary 
arrest is accompanied by the violation of life and security of person through the other 
practices that usually follow. Mainly isolation and some form of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, and the arbitrary deprivation of life. Other 
complaints included violations to the freedom of movement. 
Apart from the many cases reported noting police brutality, two cases briefly 
mentioned in the Ombudsman’s office annual reports highlight the incredible abuse of 
power on behalf of the police. The Ombudsman’s office reports that in 2007, one of the 
complaints received came from a lawyer whose visit to a police station to see their client 
was denied by a supervisor in the station who said that the police chief had prohibited any 
visits on behalf of lawyers.267 A complaint from 2008 came from an Ombudsman’s office 
assistant for the Metropolitan area of Caracas who was detained by Policaracas while 
serving his duties, defending citizens in a popular street market in Caracas.268  
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Rather than the thirty or so political prisoners, the data from the Ombudsman’s 
office annual reports notes a far larger number of claims in regards to individuals who 
have been detained (although these numbers have been declining significantly through 
the years, phenomenon which can also be seen in Table 2). It is for this reason that it is 
argued that the Afiuni case is only exceptional due to the attention it has received 
worldwide, but not due to any exceptional characteristics that make the case any different 
from other cases. 
These annual reports demonstrate that the (mis)use of pre-trial preventive 
detention in Venezuela is a widespread practice. Furthermore, the Ombudsman office 
reports allege that this widespread practice affects young men between the ages of 17 and 
24 years of age from the lowest sectors of society, many of whom had previously 
committed a criminal act, the most.269 Consequently, pre-trial preventive detention not 
only affects persons of political interest but also everyday citizens. 
Afiuni’s case is not an exceptional one in terms of the brutalities during 
investigation, sustaining the prison conditions or the despair for lacking fair trial. It is 
indeed not a usual case of detention in Venezuela when we compare the extent of 
widespread media coverage that it has received. Not many cases of pre-trial preventive 
detention ever make it to reach the awareness of the common citizens. But, in this case, 
social activists from all over the world participated in the movement to free Afiuni, public 
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protests were seen in the country and not only national but even international media 
brought the case to spotlight. Even the media discussion was often politicized, 
information from different sources was found to be inconsistent and with disparities. In 
spite of serious media attention, the propaganda seemed to be hiding several aspects of 
the entire case situation. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The main argument of this thesis was that the penitentiary crisis in Venezuela is 
brought about an inept criminal justice system. The (mis)use of pre-trial preventive 
detention is a component of this larger criminal justice system failure and feeds into the 
Venezuelan penitentiary crisis. Even though pre-trial preventive detention is allowed for 
a maximum of two years under the Venezuelan Organic Code of Criminal Procedure, the 
system works in such a way that deprives many Venezuelans of their liberty, and they are 
often kept in conditions of pre-trial preventive detention past the allotted legal time. 
Therefore, I argued that the unintentional (mis)use of pre-trial preventive detention 
further exacerbates the overcrowding in prisons and creates serious human rights 
implications. 
Throughout the research process I realized that there was not much literature or 
existing research recorded about pre-trial preventive detention in Venezuela. The little 
informative research that exists is logged by IGOs and NGOs. Such content mostly 
consists of highly politicized narratives on pre-trial preventive detention in Venezuela. 
Thus, the aim of this thesis was to introduce a counter-hegemonic perspective on the 
issue and highlight the deficiencies of the criminal justice system which have caused the 
violation of the most basic human rights. Pre-trial preventive detention has proven to be 
one of the most basic components of this dysfunctional criminal justice system. 
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Both the OVP as well as the Ombudsman’s Office reports consistently mentioned 
in their recommendations, year after year, to reduce the use of pre-trial preventive 
detention in Venezuela. These reports also consistently mentioned procedural delays as a 
widespread problem which in turn, kept individuals under pre-trial preventive detention 
for longer than the two year maximum established in the Venezuelan Organic Code of 
Criminal Procedure. Both the OVP and the Ombudsman’s Office reported that in large 
part, these problems arise from the fact that there are not enough criminal justice 
professionals, and to make matters worse, that there are low levels of professionalism in 
the Venezuelan criminal justice system in general. 
In fact, looking at Afiuni’s case as well as that of the cases reported in the 
Ombudsman’s Office reports, the problems previously mentioned are obvious. These 
cases showed that the (mis)use of pre-trial preventive detention is unintentional, most 
often perpetrated by the police and other security forces (which have gained aberrant 
forms of power due to the ineptitude of the system) and targeting young males. In sum, 
the excessive unnecessary use of pre-trial preventive detention is a consequence of 
untrained police officers and unqualified judges. Moreover, Afiuni’s case is not an 
exceptional one in terms of the brutalities and injustices experienced. However, her case 
does become significantly different from the rest due to the widespread media coverage 
that it has received. 
Furthermore, the Venezuelan case highlights a contradiction: A democratic regime 
which openly and very strongly supports human rights, but yet, has failed to protect the 
penal population’s basic human rights. Both Ungar (2003) and Pérez Perdomo (2009) 
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point out that not only do the present criminal justice structures throughout Latin America 
violate human rights, but perhaps more seriously, they also show the central weaknesses 
in contemporary Latin American democracies.270 The need for a “hard hand” policy on 
crime shows the little self-confidence and legitimacy of government institutions that are 
supposed to protect citizens and promote citizenship. This is a very important point, 
however, one that should not be turned around and used against the Chávez 
administration, which often times seems to be the case (even though “hard hand” policies 
have been dominant prior to his administration). This may not be strictly a problem of the 
Chávez administration, but rather a larger problem in the structure of the Venezuelan state 
and the criminal justice system. Nevertheless, it is an issue the current administration still 
needs to address (perhaps even more so after Chávez’s passing) as a means to legitimize 
contemporary Venezuelan democracy: the shift from a punitive system to that of a system 
focused on the liberty of persons and the preservation of their most basic human rights. 
Areas for Future Research 
The major delimitation of this research is its specific focus on pre-trial preventive 
detention. Although there are a variety of different problems within the criminal justice 
system affecting the penitentiary conditions, all of which are of high significance and are 
closely interconnected with each other, pre-trial preventive detention is the focus of this 
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study due to the high margin of positive change a reduction in its usage can lead to. 
Nevertheless, future avenues of research should consider other deficient aspects of the 
Venezuelan criminal justice system in-depth, including: The Venezuelan legal framework, 
the functioning of the criminal justice system, professionalism of the workforce, 
corruption, clientelism, and fiscal expenditures. For instance, a profound study (a 
chronology) on the Venezuelan penal and criminal code, its development and reforms 
could be very indicative of the changes (or lack thereof) in the evolution of the usage of 
pre-trial preventive detention. Placing it within the context of the administrations in 
which these took place, as well as in the political discourse of the time, and the narrative 
used in the constitution could help further understand the gap between laws and reality. 
Policy Suggestions 
Immediate Recommendations 
1. The state must re-classify penal the population, beginning by the separation of 
unconvicted and convicted persons, and later moving on to separating the convicted 
sectors according to crimes. Sex, age, and illness are transversal themes which are 
dominant over the two main categories (convicted and unconvicted). Underage 
individuals shall be kept separate. Females shall be kept separate from males. And 
those individuals with contagious diseases must also be kept separate from others. 
2. Continue to encourage the use of deprivation of liberty, specifically pre-trial 
preventive detention, as a last resort. 
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I have chosen these recommendations mainly because I believe that they are quite easy to 
implement immediately without having to wait for legal and larger systemic changes to 
occur. In fact, it is believed that these two recommendations would give the state the time 
needed to develop longer-term solutions for the penitentiary and criminal justice systems 
while significantly changing the living conditions of individuals deprived of their liberty 
in Venezuela. Nevertheless, the first recommendation may experience some 
implementation issues especially in those prisons that are completely run by inmates 
themselves. Even in these cases, the state should try to engage in dialogue with the 
inmates and perhaps establish a plan for re-categorization that involves the prison leaders. 
As long as the state can regain some kind of power back over these facilities, it is an 
accomplishment in itself.  
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